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A Napoleonic Approach to Climate Change: 





Have a plan, with branches. 




Climate change is an inevitable consequence of human greenhouse 
gas emissions. Without substantial changes in anthropogenic causes of 
climate change, there will be severe negative impacts on our planet. 
Complete abolition of greenhouse gas emissions, however, is not possible, 
nor will it necessarily stop the negative impacts of climate change. 
Therefore, substantial research must be done in geoengineering to 
understand better how we can positively act to avert significant climate 
change. Given the practical difficulties and potential effects, there must be 
comprehensive oversight. Currently, differing national laws makes this 
difficult. Additionally the United States laws do not properly cover climate 
engineering. Therefore, the United States should enact a comprehensive 
legal and regulatory program to develop and grow research in climate 
engineering. This comprehensive regime should be a model for the rest of 
the world to follow. 
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Absent substantial reductions in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, 
significant climate change will be unavoidable.1 Carbon remains in the 
atmosphere for centuries, and even if carbon emissions were stopped 
immediately, the planet would continue to warm.2 Although mitigation of 
GHG emissions remains the preferred approach, recent estimates predict 
that it will no longer suffice to avert significant planetary warming.3 While 
we should continue to mitigate, we need to develop alternative approaches 
should mitigation not occur quickly enough or to the degree required to 
avoid catastrophic climate change.4 
To minimize the worst effects of climate change, we may need to 
utilize climate engineering.5 Climate engineering could help avoid the worst 
                                                                                                                           
 1. See New Study Shows Climate Change Largely Irreversible, NATIONAL OCEANIC 
AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION (Jan. 26, 2009) [hereinafter NOAA], 
http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2009/20090126_climate.html (concluding that 
climate change caused by increases in carbon dioxide are irreversible for more than one 
thousand years after carbon emissions stop completely) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND 
LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 2. See id. (discussing the climatic changes that would continue even after cessation of 
carbon emissions). 
 3. See Susan Solomon et al., Irreversible Climate Change Due to Carbon Dioxide 
Emissions 106 PROCEED. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 1704, 1709 (2009), available at 
http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2009/01/28/0812721106.full.pdf (“Irreversible climate 
changes due to carbon dioxide emissions have already taken place, and future carbon dioxide 
emissions would imply further irreversible effects on the planet, with attendant long legacies 
for choices made by contemporary society.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE 
JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 4. See David Bello, Has the Time Come to Try Geoengineering?, SCIENTIFIC 
AMERICAN (Aug. 15, 2012), 
http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/2012/08/15/has-the-time-come-to-try-
geoengineering/ (“If the world collectively fails to restrain pollution, then we might need to 
deploy geoengineering techniques in a hurry to prevent catastrophic climate change.”) (on 
file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 5. In recognition of the common usage of “geoengineering,” this paper uses the terms 
“climate engineering” and “geoengineering” interchangeably to mean “the deliberate large-
scale manipulation of the planetary environment to counteract anthropogenic climate 
change.” THE ROYAL SOCIETY, GEOENGINEERING THE CLIMATE: SCIENCE, GOVERNANCE, AND 
UNCERTAINTY 1 (2009) [hereinafter ROYAL SOCIETY], available at 
http://royalsociety.org/uploadedFiles/Royal_Society_Content/policy/publications/2009/8693
.pdf (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT). For further discussion of these terms, see BART GORDON, ENGINEERING THE 
CLIMATE: RESEARCH NEEDS AND STRATEGIES FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 39 (2010), 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/pdfs/Geongineeringreport.pdf 
(arguing that although numerous terms besides “climate engineering” have been used to 
refer to these activities, including “climate remediation,” “climate intervention,” and 
“geoengineering,” the Chair of the House Committee on Science and Technology finds that 
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consequences of planetary warming and reduce atmospheric carbon.6 The 
United States should establish a comprehensive scheme to encourage 
research and regulation of geoengineering, because current environmental 
laws, targeted to pollution, do not address it.7 The United States should 
prohibit the implementation of geoengineering until absolutely necessary, if 
ever.8 
Part II of this Article explores the factors that make continued 
climate change inevitable. It next discusses climate engineering 
technologies and their anticipated benefits and risks. Part III reviews the 
domestic and international laws that might control climate engineering 
research and testing in the United States. Finally, Part IV presents 
considerations for a regulatory scheme that would foster the research and 
testing of climate engineering and may serve as a model for an international 
program. 
 
II. Mitigation Alone Will Not Avert Significant Climate Change 
Human-sourced emissions of greenhouse gases are causing 
significant climate change.9 We can now anticipate that we will take longer 
and be less successful in reducing these emissions than will be necessary to 
avoid significant alteration of the climate.10 As a result, we will inevitably 
need to expand the set of tools to which we can turn to combat climate 
                                                                                                                           
“climate engineering” better communicates the concept to policymakers and the public) (on 
file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 6. See id. (addressing the scientific community’s concerns regarding climate change 
and suggesting geoengineering as a potential tool). 
 7. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-903, CLIMATE CHANGE: A 
COORDINATED STRATEGY COULD FOCUS FEDERAL GEOENGINEERING RESEARCH AND INFORM 
GOVERNANCE EFFORTS 26 (2010) [hereinafter GAO], available at 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/320/310105.pdf (explaining that the extent to which existing laws 
apply to geoengineering is unclear because of the lack of information on geoengineering 
approaches and effects) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, 
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 8. See generally Lauren Morello, At U.N. Convention, Groups Push for 
Geoengineering Moratorium, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Oct. 20, 2010), 
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=at-un-convention-groups-push 
(discussing the reticence of European and other nations to use climate engineering until its 
impacts are better understood) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, 
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 9. See Solomon et al., supra note 3, at 1704 (noting that significant climate change is 
occurring “due to anthropogenic carbon dioxide already in the atmosphere”). 
 10. See ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 5, at 1 (discussing the political, social, and 
scientific impediments that prevent mitigation from being an effective method of preventing 
climate change). 
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change and its consequences.11 One of the tools that we need to consider 
more seriously is climate engineering.12 
 
A. The Climate Is Changing 
The Earth is warming.13 Figure 114 illustrates the rise in annual 





                                                                                                                           
 11. See id. at ix (“Unless future efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions are much 
more successful than they have been so far, additional action may be required should it 
become necessary to cool the Earth this century.”). 
 12. See id. at 4 (“Concerns regarding the slow progress on achieving emissions 
reductions, and uncertainties about climate sensitivity and climate tipping points have led 
some members of the scientific and political communities to suggest that geoengineering 
may offer an alternative solution to climate change mitigation.”). 
 13. See National Climatic Data Center, Global Climate Change Indicators, NATIONAL 
OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/indicators (last 
visited Sept. 7, 2013) (“This page presents the latest information from several independent 
measures of observed climate change that illustrate an overwhelmingly compelling story of a 
planet that is undergoing global warming.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE 
JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT); Goddard Institute for Space 
Studies, GISS Surface Temperature Analysis, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE 
ADMINISTRATION [hereinafter GISS], http://data.giss.nasa.gov/gistemp/graphs_v3 (last 
visited Sept. 7, 2013) (tracking temperature changes from 1880 to 2010) (on file with the 
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 14. Id. 
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The change between any individual year and another, however, may be 
unclear15 or misleading,16 because individual years are subject to the 
variability of the El Niño-La Niña cycle, volcanic eruptions, or other 
events.17 The warming trend over years, particularly recent years, however, 
is especially meaningful because it shows that the hottest years on record 
have all occurred recently.18 Indeed, all twelve years in the twenty-first 
century rank among the fourteen warmest in the 133-year period of 
record.19  
Numerous Earth systems are manifesting the indirect consequences 
of this warming, such as extreme weather events, increasing ocean 
                                                                                                                           
 15. See Zeke Hausfather, Global Temperature in 2010: Is it the Hottest Year on 
Record, and Does it Matter?, THE YALE FORUM ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE MEDIA (Feb. 
1, 2011), http://www.yaleclimatemediaforum.org/2011/02/global-temperature-in-2010-
hottest-year (noting the six major institutions that report estimates of global temperature, and 
explaining that their calculations sometimes vary because of differences in the manner in 
which they extrapolate temperatures for regions with fewer monitoring stations, such as the 
poles) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT). 
 16. See Adam Voiland, Despite Subtle Differences, Global Temperature Records in 
Close Agreement, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION (Jan. 13, 2011), 
http://www.nasa.gov/topics/earth/features/2010-climate-records.html (explaining that subtle 
differences between numbers fuel misconceptions of global warming, which is demonstrated 
when one compares 2009, the third warmest year, to 1998, 2002, 2003, 2006, and 2007, with 
the maximum difference between the years being 0.03 degrees Celsius, that the six years are 
virtually identical) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 17. See Adam Voiland, 2009: Second Warmest Year on Record; End of Warmest 
Decade, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION (Jan. 21, 2010), 
http://www.nasa.gov/topics/earth/features/temp-analysis-2009.html (providing examples of 
different factors, such as El Niño and La Niña weather events, that cause well-known 
weather fluctuations) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, 
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT); see also CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE 
FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 287 (Susan Solomon et al. eds., 2007) 
[hereinafter IPCC], available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-
report/ar4/wg1/ar4_wg1_full_report.pdf (providing more information about the effects of El 
Niño on global temperatures). 
 18. See Hausfather, supra note 15 (“Combining both land and ocean temperatures 
shows that global temperatures over the past decade have been warming slightly faster than 
would otherwise have been expected given the prior temperature trend.”). 
 19. See National Climatic Data Center, State of the Climate Global Analysis—Annual 
2012, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, 
http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/sotc/global/2012/13 (last visited Sept. 21, 2013) (“Including 
2012, all 12 years to date in the 21st century (2001–2012) rank among the 14 warmest in the 
133-year period of record.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, 
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
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temperatures, changes in precipitation patterns, and rising sea levels.20 For 
example, the global mean sea level showed little change between 1 A.D. 
and 1900,21 but it has risen since that time, and its rise is accelerating.22 
Scientists recognize two major causes of this rise: thermal expansion of the 
oceans and melting of land-based ice, such as glaciers.23 Recession of 
glaciers is a strong indicator of climate change.24 Available data, collected 
since the 1800s, reveals a considerable reduction in glacier size from 1850 
until the 1970s, when glacier thickness stabilized.25 The rate of loss has 
accelerated since the 1990s.26 
 
B. The Rise in the Planet’s Temperature Will Continue and Accelerate 
Even if we eliminate the anthropogenic sources27 of global 
warming immediately and completely, the global temperature will continue 
                                                                                                                           
 20. See National Climatic Data Center, supra note 13 (“The warming trend [is] . . . 
confirmed by other independent observations, such as the melting of mountain glaciers on 
every continent, reductions in the extent of snow cover, earlier blooming of plants in spring, 
a shorter ice season on lakes and rivers, ocean heat content, reduced arctic sea ice, and rising 
sea levels.”). 
 21. See id. (“Global mean sea level has been rising at an average rate of approximately 
1.7 mm/year over the past 100 years . . . which is significantly larger than the rate averaged 
over the last several thousand years.”); see also IPCC, supra note 17, at 409 (tracking global 
sea level changes starting from the end of the last ice age and offering projections of future 
sea level changes). 
 22. See IPCC, supra note 17, at 409 (explaining past and future increases in global sea 
level). 
 23. See id. (“The two major causes of global sea level rise are thermal expansion of 
the oceans (water expands as it warms) and the loss of land-based ice due to increased 
melting.”). 
 24. See WORLD GLACIER MONITORING SERVICE & UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT 
PROGRAMME, GLOBAL GLACIER CHANGES: FACTS AND FIGURES 13 (2008), available at 
http://www.grid.unep.ch/glaciers/pdfs/glaciers.pdf (stating that glacier changes are regarded 
as a valuable climate indicator and detection tool). 
 25. See IPCC, supra note 17, at 357 (following glacier changes starting in the 1800s). 
 26. See M. Zemp, M. Hoelzle & W. Haeberli, Six Decades of Glacier Mass-Balance 
Observations: A Review of the Worldwide Monitoring Network, 50 ANNALS OF GLACIOLOGY 
101, 106 (2009) (tracking changes in glacier melt, including the accelerated rate of loss 
between 1985 and the present). 
 27. See J. Lastovicka et al., Global Change in the Upper Atmosphere, 314 SCIENCE 
1253, 1254 (2006) (naming the increase in carbon emissions since the start of the Industrial 
Revolution as the primary instigator of climate change and noting that the upper atmosphere 
is cooling while the lower atmosphere is warming because carbon in the lower atmosphere 
creates the “greenhouse effect”); see also IPCC, supra note 17, at 139 (explaining that 
carbon emissions from burning fossil fuels include more 12C isotopes than 13C isotopes at a 
rate that would not otherwise occur in nature, and that the ratio of 12C isotopes to 13C 
isotopes in the atmosphere has increased at a rate consistent with that of CO2 emissions from 
fossil origin); Gerald A. Meehl et al., Combinations of Natural and Anthropogenic Forcings 
in Twentieth-Century Climate, 17 J. CLIMATE 3721, 3723–24 (2004) (stating that the rate and 
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to rise for decades before it stabilizes.28 Several factors will cause this 
continued rise.29 First, carbon dioxide (CO2), which remains in the 
atmosphere for centuries, will continue to trap heat.30 Second, the thermal 
inertia of the Earth’s oceans means that they absorb heat and radiate it 
gradually, for hundreds of years.31 Second, feedbacks increase the rate of 
global warming.32 
First, although natural processes, such as photosynthesis and 
absorption by ocean waters, remove some of the anthropogenic CO2 that is 
released into the atmosphere, these processes cannot remove all such CO2, 
meaning that CO2 will continue to accumulate in the atmosphere.33 
Moreover, natural processes become less successful at removing CO2 as 
                                                                                                                           
extremity of climate change cannot be explained without accounting for anthropogenic 
influences, as simulations of global temperatures including only natural influences project 
global temperatures that remain largely flat and only simulations that include human sources 
track the actual warming that has occurred since the 1970s). This evidence has allowed 
climate scientists to conclude that climate change is anthropogenic.  
 28. See Solomon et al., supra note 3, at 1704 (explaining that even if all emissions 
ceased, atmospheric temperatures would not drop significantly for at least one-thousand 
years). 
 29. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: 
SYNTHESIS REPORT 36–38 (2007) [hereinafter CLIMATE CHANGE 2007], available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf (discussing long-lived 
greenhouse gas emissions and other factors of climate change, such as land cover, solar 
radiation, and feedbacks). 
 30. See David Archer et al., Atmospheric Lifetime of Fossil Fuel Carbon Dioxide, 37 
ANN. REV. EARTH PLANET SCI. 117, 131 (2009) (“[T]he ocean will absorb most of 
[anthropogenic CO2] on a timescale of 2 to 20 centuries.”). 
 31. See generally James Hansen, et al., Target Atmospheric CO2: Where Should 
Humanity Aim?, 2 OPEN ATMOSPHERIC SCI. J. 217 (discussing the role of the ocean’s thermal 
inertia in earth temperatures as it relates to reductions in GHGs). 
 32. See Daniel A. Lashof, Benjamin J. DeAngelo, Scott R. Saleska & John Harte, 
Terrestrial Ecosystem Feedbacks to Global Climate Change, 22 ANN. REV. ENERGY ENV’T 
75, 78–81 (1997) (defining the feedback process as that whereby change in one variable 
(such as CO2 concentration) causes change in temperature, which causes change in a third 
variable (such as water vapor), which in turn causes further change in temperature). 
Feedbacks can either increase (positive feedback) or reduce (negative feedback) the system’s 
response to outside variables. Id. at 1. An example of a negative feedback is the increase in 
low clouds caused by increased evaporation, which reflect sunlight, mitigating global 
warming. Id. 
 33. See CLIMATE CHANGE 2007, supra note 29, at 36–38 (“Warming reduces terrestrial 
and ocean uptake of atmospheric CO2, increasing the fraction of anthropogenic emissions 
remaining in the atmosphere. This positive carbon cycle feedback leads to larger 
atmospheric CO2 increases and greater climate change for a given emissions scenario.”); see 
also IPCC, supra note 17, at 512 (“Natural processes such as photosynthesis, respiration, 
decay and sea surface gas exchange lead to . . . a small net uptake of CO2 . . . , partially 
offsetting the human-caused emissions.”). 
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emissions increase,34 and climate change itself suppresses carbon 
absorption by both land and ocean processes.35  
Second, because of the thermal inertia of the Earth’s oceans, the 
global temperature will continue to rise, even if carbon emissions were to 
cease.36 Thus, the warming currently experienced is only about sixty 
percent of the warming that would be expected at the atmosphere’s current 
level of CO2 concentration.37 For this reason, were society to stop emitting 
all carbon today, the planet’s temperature would not immediately return to 
pre-industrial levels or even stabilize.38 Actually, the temperature would 
continue to increase for a few decades,39 and only then remain at that new 
level for at least one thousand years.40 
Third, not only will global warming continue for several decades, 
but the rate of warming will increase due to carbon-cycle feedback cycles 
that accelerate warming.41 Indeed, models suggest that feedbacks will more 
                                                                                                                           
 34. See IPCC, supra note 17, at 538 (“The CO2 increase alone will lead to continued 
uptake by the land and the ocean, although the efficiency of this uptake will decrease 
through the carbonate buffering mechanism in the ocean, and through saturation of the land 
carbon sink.”). 
 35. See id. (“Climate change alone will tend to suppress both land and ocean carbon 
uptake, increasing the fraction of anthropogenic CO2 emissions that remain airborne and 
producing a positive feedback to climate change.”). 
 36. See Solomon et al., supra note 3, at 1704 (explaining the effects of existing 
atmospheric carbon on global temperatures even if emissions cease); see also Marten 
Scheffer, Victor Brovkin & Peter M. Cox, Positive Feedback Between Global Warming and 
Atmospheric CO2 Concentration Inferred from Past Climate Change, GEOPHYSICAL RES. 
LETTERS, May 26, 2006, at 1 (illustrating the effects of feedbacks on climate change, and 
how the release of CO2 raises global temperatures, which prompts the release of additional 
greenhouse gases, and thus the rise of CO2 appears to lag increases in temperature). 
 37. See David Archer & Victor Brovkin, The Millennial Atmospheric Lifetime of 
Anthropogenic CO2, 90 CLIMATIC CHANGE 283, 289 (2008) (“The warming we have 
experienced so far today is only about 60% of the equilibrium warming expected at today’s 
atmospheric CO2 value.”). 
 38. See H. Damon Matthews & Ken Caldeira, Stabilizing Climate Requires Near-Zero 
Emissions, GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS, Feb. 27, 2008, at 1 (stating that the warming caused 
by existing atmospheric carbon will remain for centuries even without further emissions). 
 39. See id. (“Model simulations have demonstrated that global temperatures continue 
to increase for many centuries beyond the point of CO2 stabilization.”); see also IPCC, supra 
note 17, at 822 (providing predictions of future global temperature changes, estimating that 
if the composition of the atmosphere were to be held constant, the global temperature would 
still rise by up to 0.9° C by the end of the twenty-first century). 
 40. See Solomon et al., supra note 3, at 1704 (claiming that increases in temperature 
will not drop for at least one thousand years). 
 41. See Peter M. Cox, Richard A. Betts, Chris D. Jones, Steven A. Spall & Ian J. 
Totterdell, Acceleration of Global Warming Due to Carbon-Cycle Feedbacks in a Coupled 
Climate Model, 408 NATURE 184, 184 (2000) (“[C]arbon-cycle feedbacks could significantly 
accelerate climate change over the twenty-first century.”). 
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than double the direct effect of increasing CO2 levels without feedbacks.42 
For example, feedbacks are accelerating the rate at which the Arctic ice cap 
melts.43 As the global temperature has warmed, less snow has fallen on the 
Arctic ice cap.44 Because snow reflects approximately eighty-five percent 
of the sunlight that it receives,45 snow acts as sunscreen for ice. The decline 
in snowfall has exposed ice to sunlight, which increases melting.46 As the 
melting increases, the planetary surface albedo47 decreases, thus prompting 
greater melting.48 Ocean waters absorb almost ten times more solar 
radiation than does sea ice,49 thereby increasing temperatures.50 
Additional feedbacks will accelerate the rate at which the 
atmosphere warms.51 Such feedbacks include, among others, the increase of 
                                                                                                                           
 42. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING CLIMATE CHANGE FEEDBACKS 16 
(2003) (“Climate models suggest that the temperature change enhancement associated with 
feedback processes is greater than the temperature change resulting from the direct effect of 
the carbon dioxide doubling without feedbacks.”). 
 43. See Archer & Brovkin, supra note 37, at 291 (“There are reasons to believe that 
real ice sheets might be able to collapse more quickly than our models are able to account 
for . . . .”). 
 44. See U. OF MELBOURNE, More Rain, Less Snow Leads to Faster Arctic Ice Melt, 
MELBOURNE NEWSROOM (July 2, 2011), http://newsroom.melbourne.edu/news/n-572 (last 
visited Sept. 8, 2013) (“[D]ue to warming temperatures, on more days of the year and in 
more parts of the polar region, temperatures are becoming too warm for protective snow to 
form.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT). 
 45. See id. (“Snow is highly reflective and bounces up to 85 percent of the incoming 
sunlight back into space.” (internal quotations omitted)). 
 46. See id. (discussing snow protection of Artic ice and the increased exposure and 
melt resulting from decreased snowfall). 
 47. See IPCC, supra note 17, at 941 (defining albedo as “the fraction of solar radiation 
reflected by a surface or object” and noting that snow has a high albedo, while oceans and 
vegetation-covered surfaces have low albedos). 
 48. See M. Tedesco, et al., The Role of Albedo and Accumulation in the 2010 Melting 
Record in Greenland, 6 ENV’T RES. LETTERS 1, 2 (2011) (linking decreases in surface albedo 
to increases in ice melt). 
 49. See Alicia Newton, The Big Melt, 1 NATURE REPORTS: CLIMATE CHANGE 93, 93 
(2007), available at http://www.nature.com/climate/2007/0712/pdf/ngeo.2007.31.pdf 
(“Open ocean waters absorb almost ten times more solar radiation than sea ice—a 
phenomenon known as the ice-albedo feedback.”); see also James A. Screen & Ian 
Simmonds, Declining Summer Snowfall in the Arctic: Causes, Impacts and Feedbacks, 38 
CLIMATE DYNAMICS 1, 1 (2011), available at 
http://www.springerlink.com/content/84078356qupn28g6 (comparing the relationship 
between the decline of snowfall and the decline of sea ice-cover). 
 50. See id. (“[T]he Arctic is expected to warm particularly strongly, because of the 
albedo feedback from melting the Arctic ice cap.”). 
 51. See Tom Clarke, Feedback Could Warm Climate Fast, NATURE (May 23, 2003), 
http://www.nature.com/news/1998/030519/full/news030519-9.html (naming various 
feedbacks involving “volcanoes belching out millions of tonnes of carbon dioxide, 
fluctuations in the Sun's activity as well as changing levels of greenhouse gas and ozone”) 
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water vapor,52 the weakening of carbon sinks,53 and the impairment of 
terrestrial hydrology and its impact on vegetation.54 
 
C. Mitigation Alone Is Unlikely to Avert Significant Climate Change 
For several reasons, mitigation alone is unlikely to be sufficient to 
prevent significant climate change. First, international agreements to reduce 
emissions have had limited success, and are unlikely to be successful in the 
future.55 Second, implementation of alternative energy technologies is 
unlikely to take effect soon enough to avert significant temperature 
increases.56 Finally, scientists now believe that initial targets for acceptable 
warming were too lenient, necessitating a stronger response to climate 
change than previously anticipated.57  
To avoid catastrophic climate change, international agreements 
have set goals to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.58 The United Nations 
                                                                                                                           
(on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT). 
 52. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 42, at 2 (“Water vapor feedback is the 
most important positive feedback in climate models. It is important in itself, and also 
because it amplifies the effect of every other feedback and uncertainty in the climate 
system.”). 
 53. See H. Damon Matthews & David W. Keith, Carbon-Cycle Feedbacks Increase 
the Likelihood of a Warmer Future, GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS, May 4, 2007, at 1 
(“Climate changes will likely weaken carbon sinks, leading to positive carbon-cycle 
feedbacks . . . .”). 
 54. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 42, at 60 (reporting on terrestrial 
hydrology’s role in climate change feedbacks). 
 55. See Kiel Institute, International Climate Policy, ACADEMY: THE ENVIRONMENT 
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, http://www.ifw-kiel.de/academy/the-environment-and-natural-
resources/european-and-international-climate-policy (last visited Sept. 9, 2013) (analyzing 
climate change policies for effectiveness) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL 
OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 56. See Solomon et al., supra note 3, at 1704 (explaining that climate changes caused 
by carbon presently in the atmosphere are irreversible). 
 57. See Bill McKibben, Global Warming’s Terrifying New Math, ROLLING STONE 
(July 19, 2012), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/global-warmings-terrifying-new-
math-20120719 (discussing the agreed two degree-Celsius limit on global warming as too 
lenient, as smaller temperature increases have already caused a great deal of damage) (on 
file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 58. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Action on 
Mitigation: Reducing Emissions and Enhancing Sinks, FOCUS: MITIGATION, 
http://unfccc.int/focus/mitigation/items/7171.php (last visited Sept. 8, 2013) (describing 
international initiatives and agreements focused on mitigation) (on file with the 
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT); see also 
Kyoto Protocol, infra note 61 (citing a treaty in which countries agree to limit greenhouse 
gas emissions). 
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Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)59 set an overall 
framework for intergovernmental efforts to address climate change.60 In 
1997, the parties to the UNFCCC developed the Kyoto Protocol,61 which 
committed industrialized nations to achieve reductions in greenhouse gas 
emissions by 2012.62 These countries committed themselves to collective 
reductions averaging more than five percent from 1990 emissions levels.63 
Unfortunately, emissions have continued their upward trajectory.64 As of 
2007, their collective emissions had dropped only 1.4% below their 1990 
emissions.65 At the same time, emissions from the non-industrialized 
countries had increased by 100.6% over 1990 levels, so that combined 
                                                                                                                           
 59. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 
U.N.T.S. 107. 
 60. See generally Background on the UNFCCC: The International Response to 
Climate Change, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/items/6031.php (last visited Sept. 9, 2013) (“In 1992, 
countries joined . . . [the UNFCCC] to cooperatively consider what they could do to limit 
average global temperature increases and the resulting climate change, and to cope with 
whatever impacts were, by then, inevitable.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE 
JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 61. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, opened for signature Mar. 16, 1998, 2303 U.N.T.S. 162 [hereinafter Kyoto 
Protocol]; Background on the UNFCCC: The International Response to Climate Change, 
UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
http://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/UNTS/Volume%202303/v2303.pdf (last visited Sept. 
9, 2013) (“By 1995, countries realized that emission reductions provisions in the Convention 
were inadequate. They launched negotiations to strengthen the global response to climate 
change, and, two years later, adopted the Kyoto Protocol.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON 
AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 62. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 61, at art. III, ¶ 1 (stating that the parties shall 
reduce their “aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions” of greenhouse 
gases, with a “view to reducing their overall emissions of such gases by at least 5 per cent 
below 1990 levels in the commitment period 2008 to 2012”). 
 63. See United Nations Climate Change Convention Press Release: Industrialized 
Countries to Cut Greenhouse Gas Emissions by 5.2% (Dec. 11, 1997), 
http://unfccc.int/cop3/fccc/info/indust.htm (“After 10 days of tough negotiations, ministers 
and other high-level officials from 160 countries reached agreement this morning on a 
legally binding Protocol under which industrialized countries will reduce their collective 
emissions of greenhouse gases by 5.2%.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL 
OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 64. See JOS G.J. OLIVIER, GREET JANSSENS-MAENHOUT & JEREON A.H.W. PETERS, 
TRENDS IN GLOBAL CO2 EMISSIONS 2012 REPORT 6 (2012) (detailing the increase in global 
carbon dioxide emissions). 
 65. See Kyoto-Related Fossil-Fuel CO2 Emission Totals, CARBON DIOXIDE 
INFORMATION ANALYSIS CTR. (Jan. 16, 2013), http://cdiac.ornl.gov/trends/emis/annex.html 
(providing measurements of annual emissions produced by countries listed on the Kyoto 
Protocol Annex B, as well as countries not listed on Annex B, for the years 1990–2009) (on 
file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
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global emissions had increased by 34.7% since 1990.66 As discussed below 
in Part IV, similar efforts are likely to be unsuccessful in the future. 
Second, even if nations decide to reduce CO2 emissions, structural 
aspects of the energy industry, which generates one-quarter of global 
greenhouse gases,67 will require decades to convert a significant portion of 
the industry to clean technologies.68 Although society adopts certain 
technologies with lightning rapidity,69 conversion to new energy 
technologies occurs much more slowly.70 Indeed, two “laws” of energy-
technology development dictate that the energy industry requires several 
decades to adopt and implement new technologies.71 On average, energy 
                                                                                                                           
 66. See id. (comparing industrialized countries with non-industrialized countries). 
 67. See United Nations Environment Programme, World Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
by Sector, GRID-ARENDAL (Feb. 16, 2012) [hereinafter UNEP], 
http://maps.grida.no/go/graphic/world-greenhouse-gas-emissions-by-sector (providing a 
graph illustrating world greenhouse gas emissions by sector) (on file with the WASHINGTON 
AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 68. See UNITED NATIONS ENV’T PROGRAMME, EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2012 4 (2012) 
(considering the problems shifting the energy industry to less carbon-intensive methods, 
which is “locked in” in a number of other aspects of society, such as buildings, 
transportation systems, factories, and other infrastructure); State and Local Climate and 
Energy Program, Renewable Energy, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/statelocalclimate/state/topics/renewable.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2013) 
(discussing price barriers on renewable energy sources, including unfavorable utility rate 
structures, lack of interconnection standards, barriers in environmental permitting, and lack 
of transmission) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND 
THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 69. See Michael DeGusta, Are Smart Phones Spreading Faster than Any Technology 
in Human History?, TECHNOLOGY REVIEW (May 9, 2012), 
http://www.technologyreview.com/news/427787/are-smart-phones-spreading-faster-than-
any/# (providing that landline phones required almost a full century to reach saturation (the 
point at which demand falls off), whereas mobile phones achieved this level in 20 years, 
suggesting that smart phones might reach saturation in half that time, and tablet computers 
even faster) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT). 
 70. See Michael E. Webber, Roger D. Duncan & Marianne Shivers Gonzales, Four 
Technologies and a Conundrum: The Glacial Pace of Energy Innovation, ISSUES IN SCIENCE 
AND TECHNOLOGY, http://www.issues.org/29.2/Webber.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2013) 
(stating that the transition to renewable energy sources will be slow) (on file with the 
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 71. See Gert Jan Kramer & Martin Haigh, No Quick Switch to Low-Carbon Energy, 
462 NATURE 568, 568 (2009) (explaining the two laws of energy-technology deployment: 
(i) new energy technologies expand exponentially for several decades until they become 
“material,” i.e., provide approximately one percent of world energy; (ii) after reaching 
materiality, growth rates then proceed linearly); see also Joseph J. Romm, The Proposition’s 
Opening Statement, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 19, 2008), 
http://www.economist.com/node/11918864 (discussing the possibility of the commercial 
introduction of low-carbon energy technologies; average time for an energy technology to 
reach a one percent share is twenty-five years, which follows a transition from scientific 
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technologies have required thirty years to advance from being technically 
available to reaching materiality.72 This pattern was consistent across all 
technologies, including nuclear power, natural gas, biofuels, wind, and solar 
photovoltaic.73 
Figure 274 below illustrates that several energy technologies grew 




Adoption of new technologies in the energy field requires 
significant time because of several inherent characteristics of the power 
industry. First, historical patterns show that the industry needs almost a full 
decade to build and test new technologies: three years to build a 
demonstration plant, one year to commence operations, and two to five 
                                                                                                                           
breakthrough to commercial introduction that may take decades) (on file with the 
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 72. See Kramer & Haigh, supra note 71, at 568 (“In the twentieth century, it took 30 
years for energy technologies that were available in principle to grow exponentially and 
become widely available.”). 
 73. See id. (stating that the pattern of slow commercial availability of energy 
technologies was remarkably consistent across all technologies); id. at 569 (“The challenge 
in the decades ahead is to match, perhaps even outperform, the historic ‘laws’ by designing 
energy policies directed at decarbonizing the energy industry.”); see also Peter Lund, Market 
Penetration Rates of New Energy Technologies, 34 ENERGY POL’Y 3317, 3321–22 (2006) 
(providing a separate analysis projecting that the time for solar photovoltaic and wind energy 
sources to grow from providing one percent of their total energy potential to fifty percent 
will be nearly thirty years). 
74. Kramer & Haigh, supra note 71, at 569.  
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years to identify problems and reach satisfactory operability.75 Second, 
massive amounts of capital must be invested to alter significantly the mix of 
energy sources,76 amounts that dwarf the scale of the industry.77 Third, once 
a technology reaches materiality, growth rates flatten (see Figure 3).78 This 
growth trend results in part from the nature of energy infrastructure. Power 
plants have average lives of twenty-five to fifty years, though some have 
operational lives of up to 100 years.79 Consequently, only two to four 
percent of existing sources require replacement in a given year.80 Besides 
replacing power plants, conversion to renewable energy systems will often 
require other developments, such as land acquisitions, different 
transmission methods, enabling technologies, market systems, and other 
changes, which may not yet be foreseeable.81 
Royal Dutch Shell projected that renewable sources of energy 
could reach materiality by 2030, sooner than others have forecast.82 Royal 
Dutch Shell further projected that by 2050 total energy demand would be 
                                                                                                                           
 75. See id. at 568 (explaining that energy technology relies on conversion processes 
and that the wind power required decades to develop, produce, purchase, and deploy the new 
turbines at the scale required to generate one percent of the country’s energy). 
 76. See id. (stating that it takes a few hundred billion dollars to bring a new technology 
to materiality). 
 77. See id. (“You cannot just spend $1 trillion overnight in a $30-billion industry.”). 
 78. See id. (“After reaching materiality, growth curves have historically leveled off.”). 
 79. See id. (“Unlike consumer goods that may become obsolete in a few years, the 
capital goods of the energy system have a lifetime of 25–50 years.”). 
 80. See id. (“[T]he capital goods of the energy system have a lifetime of 25–50 years. 
That means only 2–4% of existing technology needs replacing in a given year.”); Bryan K. 
Mignone, Robert H. Socolow, Jorge L. Sarmiento & Michael Oppenheimer, Atmosphere 
Stabilization and the Timing of Carbon Mitigation, 88 CLIMATIC CHANGE 252, 255 (2008) 
(explaining that development of new technology provides another incentive to plant owners 
to defer early retirement and subsequent construction of new plants; technological 
advancements discourage plant owners from committing themselves to current technologies 
and running the risk of locking themselves into expensive, yet soon-to-be-outdated, 
methods); see also id. at 252 n.3 (describing how the tendency toward economic 
postponement are somewhat mitigated by how quickly expensive technology is advancing). 
 81. See Karsten Neuhoff, Large Scale Deployment of Renewables for Electricity 
Generation, 21 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 7–9 (2005) (detailing the marketplace and non-
marketplace barriers to conversion to renewable energy); Mark A. Delucchi & Mark Z. 
Jacobson, Providing All Global Energy with Wind, Water, and Solar Power, Part II: 
Reliability, System and Transmission Costs, and Policies, 39 ENERGY POL’Y 1170, 1171 
(2011) (offering various developments that could enable renewable energy to be a viable 
source of power). 
 82. See SHELL INT’L BV, SIGNALS AND SIGNPOSTS: SHELL ENERGY SCENARIOS TO 2050 
[hereinafter SHELL INT’L] 57 chart 8 (2011) (depicting the anticipated date different energy 
sources will reach maturity) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, 
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
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one-third lower than a business-as-usual scenario.83 Even if these 
projections are correct, CO2 concentrations would not stabilize until they 
reached 550 ppm.84  
Not only are we unlikely to meet current emissions targets, but 
scientists now believe that even these targets are not stringent enough.85 
Despite mitigation efforts during the past three decades, atmospheric CO2 
concentrations have risen steadily.86 Figure 387 presents the atmospheric 















                                                                                                                           
 83. See Kramer & Haigh, supra note 71, at 569 (hypothesizing that by 2050 total 
energy demand will be a third lower than business-as-usual projections, mostly because of 
enhanced efficiency and electric vehicles). 
 84. See id. (“We believe that the Blueprints scenario is the best we can reasonably 
hope to achieve for new energy deployment, yet in it, by 2050 two-thirds of the world 
energy supply still comes from fossil fuels and CO2 concentrations stabilize at around 550 
p.m.”); see also Ailun Yang & Yiyun Cui, Global Coal Risk Assessment: Data Analysis and 
Market Research 5, tbl. I.i (World Resources Inst. Working Paper, Nov. 2012) (explaining 
that increased emissions are foreseeable in part because nearly 1,200 coal-fired power plants 
(including 360 in China and 450 in India) have been proposed to be built) (on file with the 
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 85. See Marco Steinacher, Fortunat Joos & Thomas F. Stocker, Allowable Carbon 
Emissions Lowered by Multiple Climate Targets, 499 NATURE 197, 197 (2013) (stating that 
the climate targets are unable to limit the risks from anthropogenic emissions sufficiently). 
 86. See Greenhouse Gas Index Continues Climbing, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND 
ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION (Nov. 9, 2011), 
http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2011/20111109_greenhousegasindex.html (detailing 
increases in greenhouse gases) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, 
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 87. See ESRL Data, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, 
ftp://ftp.cmdl.noaa.gov/ccg/co2/trends/co2_annmean_mlo.txt (last visited Dec. 30, 2013) 
[hereinafter ESRL Data] (compiling measurements of CO2 expressed as a mole fraction in 
dry air for the period 1959–2012) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF 
ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT).  







During this period, atmospheric CO2 increased from 338.7 ppm to 393.8 
ppm, a rise of 16.3%.88 Atmospheric CO2 increased every year.89 
Furthermore, the annual increase in CO2 is actually rising.90 Since 2002, 
annual CO2 concentrations have increased on average by 2 ppm per year.91 
Thus, not only are targets in international agreements too difficult 
to achieve,92 they may also be too lenient.93 The following example 
                                                                                                                           
 88. See Trends in Atmospheric Carbon Dioxides, NATIONAL OCEANIC AND 
ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, http://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/ (last visited 
Oct. 20, 2013) (describing calculation of mean growth rates) (on file with the WASHINGTON 
AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 89. ESRL Data, supra note 87. 
 90. See Lee R. Kump, The Last Great Global Warming, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, July 
2011, at 57, 60, available at http://physics.ucf.edu/~britt/Climate/Reading1-
Last%20great%20warming.pdf (explaining that scientists calculate this rate of atmospheric 
carbon dioxide increase as possibly ten times faster than carbon dioxide rose leading up to 
the Paleocene-Eocene Thermal Maximum, the last major planetary warming, when 
temperatures rose by five degrees Celsius). 
 91. See Annual Data: Atmospheric CO2, CO2 NOW, http://co2now.org/current-
co2/co2-now/annual-co2.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2013) (“For the past decade (2003–2012) 
the average annual increase is 2.1 ppm per year.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE 
JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 92. See SHELL INT’L, supra note 82, at 66 (discussing the probable difficulty in nations 
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illustrates the obstacles that prevent abatement of atmospheric levels of 
CO2. At the 2010 UN Climate Change Summit in Cancun, the delegates 
agreed to limit warming to a global mean temperature increase of two 
degrees Celsius,94 which requires an atmospheric content of 450 ppm of 
CO2.95 To achieve this target, global emissions immediately need to begin 
declining by more than one percent per year,96 in contrast to the annual 
global increase.97 Small delays in emissions cuts, moreover, necessitate 
much larger reductions in future emissions.98 Delay causes the atmospheric 
CO2 to peak higher and later, thus necessitating much sharper cuts to attain 
the same level.99 For this reason, stabilization at 450 ppm appears to be 
“virtually impossible even if aggressive mitigation were to begin today.”100 
Thus, not only are targets in international agreements too difficult 
to achieve,101 these targets may also be too lenient.102 Scientists have set a 
rise of two degrees Celsius as a target to avert catastrophic consequences.103 
                                                                                                                           
 93. See id. (arguing that the Copenhagen Accord failed to set effective targets). 
 94. See The Cancun Agreements, UNFCCC (Dec. 11, 2010), 
http://cancun.unfccc.int/cancun-agreements/main-objectives-of-the-agreements/#c33) (last 
visited Oct. 4, 2013) (stating that a main objective is to keep global average temperature rise 
below two degrees) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 95. See IPCC, supra note 17, at 826 (explaining that the best calculation for 
atmospheric content of 450 ppm would be a temperature increase of no more than two 
degrees). 
 96. See Mignone et al., supra note 80, at 251 (projecting that a decline in emissions by 
one percent would achieve a 475 ppm CO2 level). 
 97. See UNEP, supra note 67, at 3 (indicating that global emissions must peak before 
2020 to have a “likely” chance of staying within the two degrees Celsius target and 
describing the two degrees Celsius target as “highly unrealistic”); see also Current Rates of 
Decarbonisation Pointing to 6°C of Warming, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS (Nov. 5, 2012) 
http://press.pwc.com/GLOBAL/News-releases/current-rates-of-decarbonisation-pointing-to-
6oc-of-warming/s/47302a6d-efb5-478f-b0e4-19d8801da855) (stating that current rates of 
decarbonization point to six degrees Celsius of warming) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND 
LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 98. See Mignone et al., supra note 80, at 253 (“We find that the marginal rate of 
substitution between future and present mitigation . . . becomes quite large when the decline 
rate increases beyond 1 or 2% per year, meaning that small increases in delay necessitate 
very large increases in the intensity of future mitigation.”). 
 99. See id. at 256 (“[T]he peak atmospheric concentration would increase by 6.6 ppm 
if mitigation were delayed 1 year.”). 
 100. Id.; see also SHELL INT’L, NEW LENS SCENARIOS: A SHIFT IN PERSPECTIVE FOR A 
WORLD IN TRANSITION (2013) (finding that Shell’s most recent estimate projects that we will 
“overshoot” the 2° C goal) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, 
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 101. See SHELL INT’L, supra note 82, at 66 (discussing the probable difficulty in nations 
with such varied background and goals agreeing on a plan to control climate change). 
 102. See id. (arguing that the Copenhagen Accord failed to set effective targets). 
 103. See IPCC, supra note 17, at 826 (discussing the benefits of staying within a two 
degree global temperature increase). 
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Recent analyses, however, suggest that this rise would be too high.104 
Comparison to prehistoric records indicate that the current level of CO2 
(approximately 394 ppm) is already too high to maintain current planetary 
conditions.105 Indeed, current analyses suggest that 2° C warming may 
cause significant sea-level rises, storms, floods, droughts, and heat 
waves.106 Maintaining climate conditions comparable to those of the 
Holocene Era, during which civilization developed, requires reducing the 
atmospheric CO2 level to 350 ppm.107 
Thus, the solution required must not merely cut emissions, but also 
reduce atmospheric carbon. 
 
D. Climate Engineering: What It Is, and How It Can Help 
The realities of climate change highlight two key considerations. 
First, significant climate disruption is foreseeable, regardless of future 
emission levels.108 Second, mitigation alone cannot return the climate to its 
preindustrial state.109 To avoid severe climate disruption, we need to 
explore a broad range of alternatives.110 These alternatives should include 
climate engineering. 
Climate engineering refers to efforts to intervene in the Earth’s 
climate system to reduce temperature and to stabilize it at a lower level than 
would be obtained without intervention; it requires deliberate efforts and 
has global impacts.111 Thus, it involves both deliberate efforts and global 
impacts to be effective. 
                                                                                                                           
 104. See Hansen et al., supra note 31, at 217 (arguing that a limitation of one degree 
Celsius, as opposed to the two degree goal, could prevent irreparable species and ice sheet 
loss) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT). 
 105. See id. at 218 (calculating that even at the current level of atmospheric CO2, 
additional warming is already “in the pipeline” because of planetary feedbacks, and 
estimating that the planet is committed to an additional 1.4° C of warming, a total increase 
of 2° C from preindustrial levels). 
 106. See id. at 225 (stating that even a small change in surface temperature could spur 
extreme environmental responses). 
 107. See id. at 229 (suggesting an initial goal of 350 ppm to return planetary balance). 
 108. See ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 5, at ix (stating that emissions changes alone have 
not been successful in providing a solution to the global warming issue). 
 109. See id. (arguing that mitigation efforts will not be implemented quickly enough to 
make necessary changes needed to stunt global warming). 
 110. See id. (“Unless future efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions are much more 
successful then they have been so far, additional action may be required should it become 
necessary to cool the Earth this century.”). 
 111. See id. (defining geoengineering as the “deliberate large-scale intervention in the 
Earth’s climate system, in order to moderate global warming”). 
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Climate engineering techniques fall into two broad categories. The 
first, solar radiation management (SRM), would reduce the amount of solar 
radiation available to heat the planet.112 The second, carbon dioxide 
removal (CDR), would remove CO2 from the atmosphere.113 Within these 
two categories, climate engineering techniques may be further classified. 
First, they may be grouped according to the length of their life cycles: the 
effects of some would be short-lived and could be “shut off” almost 
immediately;114whereas the effects of other techniques might last for 
decades or even centuries.115 Second, techniques vary by their means of 
intervention. Some methods require small-scale changes (painting roofs to 
reflect more sunlight, for example), whereas others involve the 
manipulation or enhancement of biological processes.116 Finally, methods 
may be grouped according to the amount of time required before they take 
effect; certain types can begin to cool the planet within months, whereas 
others require decades.117 
SRM techniques reflect the sun’s inbound light and heat back into 
space.118 They include a broad range of methods and costs; some SRM 
techniques are simplistic while others are technologically complex and 
                                                                                                                           
 112. See id. at 1 (“[SRM] methods: which reduce the net incoming . . . solar radiation 
received, by deflecting sunlight, or by increasing the reflectivity (albedo) of the atmosphere, 
clouds or the Earth’s surface.”). 
 113. See id. (“[CDR] methods: which reduce the levels of carbon dioxide (CO2) in the 
atmosphere, allowing outgoing long-wave (thermal infra-red) heat radiation to escape more 
easily.”). 
 114. See generally id. (evaluating various geoengineering methods for “timeliness,” 
which includes “the state of readiness for implementation . . . and the speed with which the 
intended effect (on climate change) would occur”). 
 115. See Mark Williams, Cooling the Planet, M.I.T. TECH. REV. (Feb. 13, 2007), 
http://www.technologyreview.com/news/407306/cooling-the-planet/ (stating that the cost of 
climate engineering techniques would vary dramatically, with some, such as stratospheric 
aerosols, costing a few billion dollars, and others, such as space-based mirrors, requiring 
trillions of dollars) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT); see also Virgoe, infra note, 146, at 108 (arguing that methods will 
also vary in their need for ongoing maintenance, some lasting a long time (painted roofs), 
and others requiring repetition (aerosols) or maintenance (space mirrors) on a regular basis). 
 116. See ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 5, at 47 (stating that some improvements will be 
more simplistic in nature, while others will require industrial-scale developments). 
 117. See Peter Davidson, Chris Burgoyne, Hugh Hunt & Matt Causier, Lifting Options 
for Stratospheric Aerosol Engineering: Advantages of Tethered Balloon Systems, 370 PHIL. 
TRANS. R. SOC. A 4263, 4264 (2012) (stating the importance of analysis of anticipated 
timetables for different methods because some methods, such as CDR, might require up to 
fifty years to have an impact, whereas others, such as SRM techniques, could take effect 
within a few years). 
 118. See ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 5, at 1 (explaining that SRM techniques work by 
deflecting sunlight or making the atmosphere more reflective). 
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prohibitively expensive.119 They also vary as to the part of the environment 
which they affect—the earth’s surface, its atmosphere, or outer space.120 
Surface-based techniques include painting roofs white, planting more 
reflective crops, or covering desert or ocean surfaces with reflective 
materials.121 Atmospheric methods increase the reflectivity of clouds122 or 
mimic the temporary, global cooling that results from the ejection of sulfur 
particles from volcanic eruptions123 by injecting aerosol particles into the 
atmosphere.124 
A major advantage of some SRM techniques is that they may be the 
only means to reduce the global temperature almost immediately, should 
that become necessary,125 because they could take effect within a matter of 
months.126 SRM, however, does not remove CO2 from the atmosphere; it 
merely compensates for the increased levels of CO2.127 As a result, 
scientists anticipate SRM could have unintended consequences.128 
Scientists also believe that, once started, some SRM methods must be used 
                                                                                                                           
 119. See Roger Angel, Feasibility of Cooling the Earth with a Cloud of Small 
Spacecraft near the Inner Lagrange Point (L1), 103 PROC. NATL. ACAD. SCI. 17184, 
17188 (2006) (explaining that some space-based reflective mirrors, for instance, could 
require several decades and trillions of dollars to put into place). 
 120. See Peter J. Irvine, Andy Ridgwell & Daniel J. Lunt, Climatic Effects of Surface 
Albedo Geoengineering, J. GEOPHYSICAL RES., Dec. 22, 2011 at 2 (discussing how different 
geoengineering techniques affect different aspects of the environment). 
 121. See id. at 2 (summarizing crop, desert, and urban albedo geoengineering 
techniques). 
 122. See Angel, supra note 119, at 17185 (detailing the addition of particles of various 
materials, such as sea salt, to whiten clouds). 
 123. See id. at 17188 (“One way known to reduce heat input, observed after volcanic 
eruptions, is to increase aerosol scattering in the stratosphere.”). 
 124. See David W. Keith, Edward Parson & M. Granger Morgan, Research on Global 
Sun Block Needed Now, 463 NATURE 426, 426 (2010), available at 
http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v463/n7280/full/463426a.html (“SRM could alter the 
global climate within months—as suggested by the 1991 eruption of Mount Pinatubo, which 
cooled the globe about 0.5° C in less than a year by injecting sulphur dioxide into the 
stratosphere.”). 
 125. See ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 5, at 47 (“SRM methods are the only way in 
which global temperatures could be reduced at short notice, should this become necessary.”). 
 126. See Scott Barrett, The Incredible Economics of Geoengineering, 39 ENVTL. & RES. 
ECON. 45, 47 (2008) (stating the albedo enhancement technique could lead to climate 
response in a matter of months). 
 127. See id. (“Geoengineering is a stopgap measure, a ‘quick fix,’ a ‘Band-Aid.’”). 
 128. See ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 5, at 50 (explaining the varied responses of 
different aspects of climate; precipitation is sensitive to specific aspects of climate, while 
other natural systems are likely to have unforeseen reactions to decreased temperatures in 
high-CO2 conditions). 
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continuously, or warming will return immediately and at a rate too fast for 
humans and animals to adapt.129 
In contrast to SRM, CDR can reverse warming, since it reduces the 
atmosphere’s CO2 content.130 However, reversal requires the reduction of a 
significant fraction of CO2 before it alters the atmospheric balance.131 Thus, 
in contrast to SRM, CDR may require several decades before it can have a 
discernible effect on the environment.132 On the other hand, its ability to 
lower the CO2 content of the atmosphere may become critical if significant 
mitigation efforts come too late to avoid dangerous warming.133 
Furthermore, CDR involves fewer environmental risks.134 This contrasts 
with SRM, which, besides several possible adverse consequences, would 
only create an artificial and approximate balance between increased 
atmospheric gas concentrations and sunlight levels.135 
CDR techniques involve the storage of CO2 in the ocean or in the 
ground.136 Ocean-based methods include ocean fertilization (promoting the 
                                                                                                                           
 129. See Alan Robock, Martin Bunzl, Ben Kravitz & Georgiy Stenchikov, A Test for 
Geoengineering?, 327 SCIENCE 530, 531 (Jan. 2010), available at 
http://www.sciencemag.org/content/327/5965/530.short (stating that when geoengineering is 
started and then stopped, climate change may occur more rapidly than if geoengineering was 
never attempted) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT). See generally Robert L. Olson, Soft Geoengineering: A Gentler 
Approach to Addressing Climate Change, ENV’T MAG., Sept./Oct. 2012, available at 
http://www.see.ed.ac.uk/~shs/Climate%20change/Geo-politics/Bright%20water.pdf 
(explaining that as a response to these objections, scientists have begun to explore “soft 
geoengineering” techniques, and, further, characteristics of these methods include multiple 
benefits beyond climate impact, low or no anticipated negative ecosystem effects, and rapid 
reversibility) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND 
THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 130. See ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 5, at ix (“Carbon dioxide removal techniques 
address the root cause of climate change by removing greenhouse gases from the 
atmosphere.”). 
 131. See id. at x (explaining that the scale is an important component to the 
effectiveness of CDR methods). 
 132. See id. (stating that the effects of CDR methods will be felt long-term, without 
direct short-term benefits). 
 133. See UNEP, supra note 67, at 3 (calculating that forty percent of scenarios with a 
“likely” chance of meeting the two degree Celsius target have net negative total greenhouse 
emissions; these scenarios assume utilization of carbon capture and storage, a CDR 
technology). 
 134. See ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 5, at x (explaining that the environmental effects 
of SRM methods are mostly unknown, leading to greater risk than CDR techniques). 
 135. See IPCC, supra note 17, at 4 (contrasting CDR and SRM techniques, particularly 
the potential negative effects of SRM, specifically that SRM would require long-term 
maintenance). 
 136. See ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 5, at 9 (“A number of methods aimed at the direct 
removal of CO2 from the atmosphere have been proposed, including . . . either chemical or 
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growth of carbon-consuming phytoplankton) and enhanced 
upwelling/downwelling (altering ocean circulation to increase the 
availability of nutrients to enhance phytoplankton growth (upwelling) while 
accelerating the return of CO2-concentrated surface water to the deep sea 
(downwelling)).137 Land-based techniques include direct air capture and 
sequestration, use of biomass and sequestration, and afforestation.138  
Whether SRM or CDR, several aspects of climate engineering 
make it a compelling option: climate engineering is easier than mitigation 
to implement; it produces benefits sooner than other approaches, it is more 
politically viable, and it can reduce, rather than just stabilize, CO2 levels.139 
For these reasons we should anticipate that one or more nations—or even 
private parties—will seriously consider implementing climate engineering 
methods.140 
A key advantage of climate engineering over mitigation is that 
climate engineering would be much easier to institute effectively. 
Mitigation requires billions of consumers to change energy-consumption 
habits, as well as unprecedented international cooperation.141 Climate 
engineering, on the other hand, could be implemented by a single state, or 
even by a single—albeit well-financed—individual.142 For instance, at least 
two methods, stratospheric aerosols and cloud whitening, could cost less 
than $10 billion per year, each.143 When compared to the trillions of dollars 
                                                                                                                           
physical processes to remove the greenhouse gas, and biologically based methods . . . to 
simulate or enhance natural carbon storage processes.”). 
 137. See GAO, supra note 7, at 7 (“Enhanced upwelling/downwelling—altering ocean 
circulation patterns to bring deep, nutrient-rich water to the ocean’s surface (upwelling), to 
promote phytoplankton growth—which removes CO2 from the atmosphere, as described 
below—and accelerating the transfer of CO2 -rich water from the surface of the ocean to the 
deep-sea (downwelling).”). 
 138. See ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 5, at 10 (describing land-based CDR methods). 
 139. See Scott Barrett, The Incredible Economics of Geoengineering, 39 ENVTL. & RES. 
ECON. 45, 45 (2008) (discussing how geoengineering is both politically and economically 
more feasible and could possibly reduce, rather than just prevent, climate change). 
 140. See ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 5, at 42–43 (describing the involvement of private 
parties in the implementation of geoengineering techniques). 
 141. See Barrett, supra note 139, at 50 (“Theory points to the difficulty in achieving 
substantial and wide scale cooperation for this problem, and the record to date sadly supports 
this prediction.”); id. at 49 (explaining that stabilization of CO2 levels would require cutting 
emissions by sixty to eighty percent, yet emissions have risen approximately twenty percent 
since the adoption of the Framework Convention on Climate Change). 
 142. See William C.G. Burns, Climate Geoengineering: Solar Radiation Management 
and Its Implications for Intergenerational Equity, 4 STANFORD J. LAW, SCI. & POL’Y 46, 46 
n.50 (2011) (arguing that the cost of many geoengineering options might be “well within the 
budget of almost all nations,” as well as a handful of wealthy individuals, potentially 
allowing a rogue nation or individual to engage in climate engineering unilaterally). 
 143. See Barrett, supra note 139, at 49 (establishing that geoengineering techniques are 
relatively low-cost when compared with the costs of mitigation, as seen in the Panel on 
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that mitigation is anticipated to cost annually,144 such an alternative is 
essentially “costless.”145 
Besides its lower financial costs, geoengineering will likely require 
less political capital.146 As mentioned, mitigation requires consumers to 
conserve, change habits, or both.147 Businesses must modify their products 
or, in some cases, face extinction. Thus, mitigation requires the cooperation 
of billions. Because of the inconvenience and disruption associated with 
mitigation, most governments have been unwilling to require the reductions 
necessary to curtail the use of fossil fuels significantly.148 Most climate 
engineering proposals, on the other hand, require no such sacrifices. 
Although geoengineering may have its own negative consequences, in 
many instances it will not require the unpopular changes in lifestyle or 
                                                                                                                           
Policy Implications of Greenhouse Warming calculation that adding aerosol dust to the 
stratosphere would cost just pennies per ton of CO2 mitigated); see also James Temple, 
Cloud Brightening: Theory to Prototype, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON. (Jan. 5, 2013), available 
at http://www.sfgate.com/science/article/Cloud-brightening-theory-to-prototype-
4170478.php (noting that cloud brightening using seawater was projected to cost as little as 
$2.5 billion annually) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, 
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT); Barrett, supra note 139, at 49 (stating even persons 
skeptical of such calculations have acknowledged that the costs of such systems would be 
“trivial” compared to mitigation approaches). 
 144. See Justin McClellan, David W. Keith & Jay Apt, Cost Analysis of Stratospheric 
Albedo Modification Delivery Systems, ENVIRON. RES. LETT., Aug. 30, 2012 at 6, available 
at http://iopscience.iop.org/1748-9326/7/3/034019/pdf/1748-9326_7_3_034019.pdf 
(estimating that by 2030 the annual cost of mitigation will range from $200 billion to $2 
trillion) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT). 
 145. See Barrett, supra note 139, at 49 (estimating SRM would have a marginal cost of 
approximately 1/10,000th of the cost of mitigation); see also Alan Carlin, Why a Different 
Approach Is Required If Global Climate Change Is to Be Controlled Efficiently or Even at 
All, 32 WM & MARY ENVTL. L & POL’Y REV. 685, 739 (2008) (“SRM is estimated to have a 
marginal cost about 1/10,000th as expensive as ERD [exclusive regulatory de-carbonization, 
the mitigation strategy of exclusively reducing carbon output] per equivalent ton of carbon 
reduced to limit global temperature increases to 2° C above pre-industrial levels using 
current assumptions concerning climate sensitivity.”). 
 146. See John Virgoe, International Governance of a Possible Geoengineering 
Intervention to Combat Climate Change, 95 CLIMATIC CHANGE 103, 107 (2009) (explaining 
the differences in terms of participation geoengineering requires as opposed to mitigation or 
other CO2 reduction methods). 
 147. See Carlin, supra note 145, at 721 (“It is difficult to see . . . why many constituents 
would not pursue every available loophole rather than reduce their welfare and freedom of 
choice.”). 
 148. See id. at 720–21 (“[P]oliticians would be required to maintain unusually strong 
resolve as the population learns what would be the real effects of the [mitigation] 
measures. . . . It is difficult to see why politicians would be willing to force their constituents 
to adopt unpopular and expensive constraints on their activities. . . .”); ROYAL SOCIETY, 
supra note 5, at 4 (arguing that because of the many unknown factors, political communities 
may lean away from mitigation toward an alternative, such as geoengineering). 
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business models necessitated by mitigation.149 When combined with its 
lower costs, climate engineering may be less disruptive and thus more 
palatable.150 
Absent utilization of geoengineering, global warming will not 
reverse until atmospheric CO2 declines through natural processes.151 Thus, 
to produce a rapid reduction in the amount of atmospheric carbon and its 
consequences, climate engineering is the only choice.152 
 
E. Climate Engineering: Objections and Responses 
Despite the advantages of climate engineering, critics raise many 
legitimate concerns regarding the moral hazard presented by climate 
engineering, the risk of unforeseen or uneven consequences, and the 
potential for misuse or irresponsible implementation.153 
The primary objection to pursuing climate engineering is that it will 
give rise to a moral hazard and will remove the incentive to reduce fossil 
fuel use.154 Essentially, if society can avert the worst consequences of 
climate change through geoengineering, then it will not undertake the 
                                                                                                                           
 149. See Virgoe, supra note 146, at 106–07 (describing the socio-political 
characteristics of geoengineering). 
 150. See Carlin, supra note 145, at 721 (“Global warming has all the psychological 
characteristics—a long time horizon, uncertainty, and few readily apparent effects to remind 
people that there is a problem in their everyday lives—needed to keep it at a modest level of 
priority.”). 
 151. See Samuel Thernstrom, What Role for Geoengineering?, AMERICAN (Mar. 2, 
2010), available at http://www.american.com/archive/2010/march/what-role-for-
geoengineering (“[B]y the time the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide peaks, 
whatever amount of warming it will cause will be locked in, and it will take centuries for the 
amount of CO2 in the atmosphere to decline significantly through natural processes.”) (on 
file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 152. See Barrett, supra note 139, at 47–49 (explaining climate engineering’s usefulness 
as a short-term solution). 
 153. See generally ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 5 (discussing various concerns 
associated with geoengineering). 
 154. See William Daniel Davis, What Does “Green” Mean: Anthropogenic Climate 
Change, Geoengineering, and International Environmental Law, 43 GEO. L. REV. 901, 946–
47 (2009) (“One of the most commonly voiced objections to geoengineering is that it would 
create a moral hazard by reducing the political will to adopt stringent mitigation policies that 
would reduce GHG emissions and attack anthropogenic climate change at the source.”); see 
also Use of Geoengineering to Curb Warming Is ‘Moral Corruption,’ says Ethicist, CLIMATE 
SPECTATOR (Aug. 23, 2011), http://www.climatespectator.com.au/news/use-geoengineering-
curb-warming-moral-corruption-says-ethicist (“Geoengineering, or deliberate alteration of 
the Earth’s environment by humans in the name of climate adaptation, could be considered a 
form of ‘moral corruption,’ says a leading Australian ethicist.”) (on file with the 
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
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societal and lifestyle changes required for effective mitigation.155 Thus, 
society will continue with business as usual (either maintaining or 
increasing levels of fossil fuel use), relying upon climate engineering to 
avoid the worst effects of climate change.156 
There are several responses to the moral hazard objection to 
geoengineering. Although the pursuit of climate engineering may create a 
moral hazard, any moral hazard may be an acceptable risk or may be offset 
by greater concerns, such as an anticipated global catastrophe.157 Second, 
geoengineering may actually encourage mitigation.158 According to this 
theory, the radical nature of climate engineering and its potential risks may 
inspire society to pursue mitigation more seriously.159 
Critics make a second objection to climate engineering—they argue 
that the dangers of climate engineering could outweigh its benefits. For 
example, spraying sulfate particles into the atmosphere could trigger acid 
rain160 and deplete the ozone layer;161 albedo modification may impair 
                                                                                                                           
 155. See Stephen M. Gardiner, Some Early Ethics of Geoengineering the Climate: A 
Commentary on the Values of the Royal Society Report, 20 ENVTL. VALUES 163, 166 (2011) 
(“In the current context, the worry is that ‘major efforts in geoengineering may lead to a 
reduction of effort in mitigation and/or adaptation because of a premature conviction that 
geoengineering has provided “insurance” against climate change.’”). 
 156. See Russell Powell et al., The Ethics of Geoengineering 2 (James Martin Geoeng’g 
Ethics Working Grp. Working Draft), available at 
http://www.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0013/21325/Ethics_of_Geoengine
ering_Working_Draft.pdf (“[T]he fear is that polluters, policymakers or society at large will 
have weaker incentives to reduce carbon emissions if they know that geoengineering 
methods can and likely will be used to offset these emissions. This will lead to greater 
carbon emissions.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 157. See Gardiner, supra note 155, at 167 (“[I]f at this point the odds of eventual global 
catastrophe are high, perhaps society should pursue geoengineering even if doing so makes 
progress on conventional responses (even) less likely.”). 
 158. See Davis, supra note 154, at 947 (“[T]he prospect of actual implementation of 
geoengineering programs, given their radical nature and frightening potential side effects, 
might generate, rather than reduce, the political will necessary to implement more aggressive 
mitigation policies.”). 
 159. See id. (stating that the radical nature and negative side effects of geoengineering 
may increase the likelihood that society will pursue mitigation policies). 
 160. See Ben Kravitz, et al., Sulfuric Acid Deposition From Stratospheric 
Geoengineering with Sulfate Aerosols, J. GEOPHYSICAL RES., Jul. 28, 2009, at 1, 4, available 
at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1029/2009JD011918/abstract (discussing the 
potential problems that an increase in sulfur deposition will have on ecosystems) (on file 
with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND ENVIRONMENT). 
 161. See Simone Tilmes, et al., Impact of Geoengineered Aerosols on the Troposphere 
and Stratosphere, J. GEOPHYSICAL RES., Jun. 27, 2009, at 1, 2 (“Enhanced stratospheric 
aerosol levels after a volcanic eruption, would disturb ozone photochemistry in midlatitudes, 
because of the suppression of stratospheric NOx, leading to enhanced halogen catalyzed 
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ecosystem productivity by reduced photosynthesis;162 ocean fertilization 
may undermine biological productivity in non-fertilized areas, cause 
widespread eutrophication and anoxia, and stimulate toxic algal blooms;163 
sequestered carbon could escape and reenter the atmosphere.164 Without 
further study of climate engineering and its effects, analyses of climate 
engineering’s benefits and costs are too uncertain to be valuable. 
Alternatively, critics object that the dangers imposed by 
geoengineering could disproportionately affect certain regions or 
populations.165 Lower precipitation may particularly impact East and 
Southeast Asia, Africa, and the Amazon and Congo valleys.166 This may 
undermine the food security of two billion people.167 Thus, climate 
engineering will create its own winners and losers, as will climate 
change.168 While most nations may benefit from reduced global 
temperatures, others will suffer from changed atmospheric conditions.169 
                                                                                                                           
ozone depletion.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 162. See Davis, supra note 154, at 924 (“Albedo modification schemes pose a variety 
of frightening side effects, such as impaired ecosystem productivity from reduced 
photosynthesis.”). 
 163. See Burns, supra note 142, at 40–41 (“Several studies have also indicated that 
ocean iron fertilization, a CDR approach, could undermine biological productivity in non-
fertilized regions, cause widespread eutrophication and anoxia, and stimulate toxic algal 
blooms.”). 
 164. See Bob van der Zwaan & Koen Smekens, CO2 Capture and Storage with Leakage 
in an Energy-Climate Model, 14 ENVTL. MODEL. & ASSESS. 135, 135 (2009) (“The leakage 
time frame that characterises [carbon sequestration], and the compatibility of that time frame 
with climate change policy and targets as well as features of the carbon cycle, is determinant 
for [sequestration]’s suitability to mitigate, postpone, or preclude climate change.”). 
 165. See KELSI BRACMORT & RICHARD K. LATTANZIO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R41371, GEOENGINEERING: GOVERNANCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY, 21 (2013), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41371.pdf (“[T]he global impacts of geoengineering 
activities—both its benefits and risks—may be unevenly distributed across stakeholders.”) 
(on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT). 
 166. See Burns, supra note 142, at 40 (“Stratospheric sulfate aerosol injection . . . could 
lead to a substantial reduction in precipitation in monsoon regions in East and South-East 
Asia and Africa . . . Diebacks of tropics forests could also be triggered by substantial 
precipitation declines in the Amazon and Congo valleys.”). 
 167. See id. (“The severe reduction in monsoonal intensity that will result from the 
reduction in precipitation could potentially undermine the food security of 2 billion people in 
the region.”). 
 168. See Davis, supra note 154, at 929 (stating that the impact of climate change will 
not be uniformly negative as higher latitude countries, particularly Canada and Russia, may 
benefit from warmer global temperatures, but that there would be disparities in regional 
meteorological effects of geoengineering as well). 
 169. See id. (“[I]n general, industrialized countries may benefit relative to less 
industrialized countries due to their comparatively greater ability to adapt to the 
consequences of climate change.”). 
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Critics also voice concerns about the possibility of 
geoengineering’s misuse.170 A rogue nation or entity could decide 
unilaterally to implement geoengineering over the objection of the world 
community.171 Second, governments may use climate engineering 
technologies either for their own benefit or as a weapon against enemies.172 
Third, private interests may promote geoengineering for their own profit.173 
The reality is that a single nation, corporation, or individual is 
capable of undertaking climate engineering.174 This fact may actually 
support responsible research and testing of geoengineering.175 First, an open 
research program will reduce the perceived need by a rogue country or 
group to develop its own program.176 Second, a thorough knowledge of 
these methods will better enable the world community to recognize the 
                                                                                                                           
 170. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-71, CLIMATE ENGINEERING: 
TECHNICAL STATUS, FUTURE DIRECTIONS, AND POTENTIAL RESPONSES, at i (2011), available 
at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1171.pdf (stating that experts who advocate research to 
develop geoengineering use caution against the misuse the research could bring) (on file 
with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 171. See Barrett, supra note 139, at 46 (discussing the likelihood that countries may 
unilaterally develop and deploy geoengineering because “incentives for countries to reduce 
emissions on a substantial scale are too weak, and incentives for them to develop 
geoengineering are too strong” for a commitment to abstain from experimenting with 
geoengineering to be a realistic prospect). 
 172. See James R. Fleming, The Climate Engineers, WILSON Q., Spring 2007, at 1, 8 
(discussing the possibility of weaponized weather manipulation) (on file with the 
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 173. See John Vidal, Bill Gates Backs Climate Scientists Lobbying for Large-Scale 
Geoengineering, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 5, 2012), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/feb/06/bill-gates-climate-scientists-
geoengineering (discussing the conflict of interest that may arise from wealthy individuals 
financially supporting geoengineering research) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE 
JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 174. See Memorandum from the Action Group on Erosion, Technology and 
Concentration to the U.K. House of Commons ¶ 16 (Dec. 2009) [hereinafter ETC Group 
Memorandum], available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmsctech/221/10011318.htm 
(“The technical capacity to attempt large-scale climate interventions could be in some hands 
of individuals, corporations, states within the next ten years.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON 
AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 175. See ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 5, at 37 (stating that in order to deal with 
irresponsible parties dangerously experimenting with geoengineering, “many commentators 
have suggested forming an international consortium to explore the safest and more effective 
options, while also building a community of responsible geoengineering researchers”). 
 176. See David G. Victor, et al., The Geoengineering Option, FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
(Mar./Apr. 2009), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64829/david-g-victor-m-granger-
morgan-jay-apt-john-steinbruner-and-kat/the-geoengineering-option (discussing the need for 
a cooperative, international research agenda in order to avoid independent countries or 
organizations deploying their own geoengineering schemes) (on file with the WASHINGTON 
AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
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effects of a rogue entity that attempts to geoengineer.177 Finally, since 
private entities might emerge as interest groups advocating for the 
deployment of one or more methods,178 an open research program will 
reduce their influence and ensure that the results and analyses are unbiased 
by any outside circumstances.179 An open research program would also 
minimize the risks that testing is rushed or that it or its results are skewed to 
reach particular results.180 
Another concern is that the related research could foster 
“technological momentum” in support of geoengineering.181 This refers to 
the tendency of research programs to create a body of researchers vested in 
the development of the technology they are researching.182 This tendency 
has arisen in a number of contexts, notably medical technology and 
weapons systems.183 In part because of the disparity in expertise, 
policymakers are reluctant to oppose the recommendations of these groups 
for further development and deployment of new technologies.184  
While the risk of such technological momentum is real, several 
checks should work to minimize this concern. Ideally, any decision to 
utilize climate engineering should be made at a global level, thereby 
                                                                                                                           
 177. See Mark G. Lawrence, The Geoengineering Dilemma: To Speak or Not to Speak, 
77 CLIMATIC CHANGE 245, 246 (2006) (“[W]ithout a good overview of potential 
geoengineering efforts which might eventually be undertaken, it would be difficult to 
monitor for the possibility of ‘covert’ geoengineering.”). 
 178. See Victor et al., supra note 176 (“[S]ome geoengineering options are cheap 
enough to be deployed by wealthy and capable individuals or corporations.”). 
 179. See id. (stating that a cooperative, international research agenda is necessary in 
order to establish rules that govern the use of geoengineering technology for the good of the 
entire planet). 
 180. See id. (discussing the risk that geoengineering might be undertaken by a state 
without appropriate concern for harms elsewhere). 
 181. See Davis, supra note 154, at 948 (“Another potential objection to a 
geoengineering research program is that it would generate ‘technological momentum,’ so 
that if it was determined that geoengineering was possible, even if likely to generate side 
effects, the result would be development and eventual deployment.”); see also U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-71, CLIMATE ENGINEERING: TECHNICAL STATUS, FUTURE 
DIRECTIONS, AND POTENTIAL RESPONSES, i (2011), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1171.pdf (stating that advocates of geoengineering research 
caution against the misuse the research could bring) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE 
JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 182. See Davis, supra note 154, at 948 (indicating “technological momentum” occurs 
when “research programs create a community of researchers that functions as an interest 
group promoting the development of the technology that they are investigating”). 
 183. See id. at 949 (providing the fields of medical technology and weapons systems as 
two examples of areas in which “technological momentum” has been observed). 
 184. See id. (“Given [researchers’] comparative level of expertise, policymakers may 
have a difficult time resisting calls for development and deployment of geoengineering 
technologies.”). 
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minimizing the influence of interest groups.185 Second, any research 
program should be open and transparent.186 Besides reducing the likelihood 
that a rogue entity would be able to implement a method undetected, an 
open research program would also provide accurate and unbiased data, 
thereby reducing the risk that a vested interest could unduly influence 
research.187 
The risks cited by critics are serious, but the true extent of these 
risks is still unknown,188 and we are uncertain that we can predict all of the 
possible risks.189 That is part of the point of this paper. Because of the 
potential benefits and possible need for climate engineering, we should 
create a legal regime that facilitates research into geoengineering and its 
consequences, rather than one that prohibits or discourages investigation 
into these methods ab initio.190 Early exploration of these technologies has 
another critical advantage: it makes it more likely that we will know of 
benefits and risks before a climate emergency actually arises.191 
 
                                                                                                                           
 185. See infra Part IV.D (discussing the importance of a moratorium on deployment in 
order to ensure that research programs are primarily used for research and not 
implementation). 
 186. See infra Part IV.C (arguing for the benefits of transparency in a domestic research 
program). 
 187. See Davis, supra note 154, at 934 (stating that a transparent research program will 
lessen the likelihood that a state or “rogue billionaire” will unilaterally implement a 
geoengineering program). 
 188. See Douglas G. MacMartin, David W. Keith, Ben Kravitz & Ken Caldeira, 
Management of Trade-Offs in Geoengineering Through Optimal Choice of Non-Uniform 
Radiative Forcing, 3 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE LETTERS 365, 365 (2013) (stating that 
recent analysis suggests desired climate moderation may be achieved with thirty percent less 
solar insulation than previously anticipated, thus reducing the potential side effects of SRM, 
demonstrating the uncertainty that these risks will be as great as projected). 
 189. See Alan Robock, 20 Reasons Why Geoengineering May Be a Bad Idea, BULL. 
ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, May/June 2008, at 14, 17 (discussing the uncertainty in predicting the 
outcome of geoengineering efforts) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF 
ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 190. See generally infra Part IV.E (arguing that the United States should use NEPA and 
financial incentives to conduct geoengineering research and testing). 
 191. See Gareth Davies, Framing the Social, Political, and Environmental Risks and 
Benefits of Geoengineering, 46 TULSA L. REV. 261, 270 (2010) (explaining that the “moral 
hazard” argument against geoengineering presents a real danger if global warming reaches a 
point where geoengineering is clearly desirable, because the political and research base will 
not be there). 
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F. Climate Engineering: The Need to Accelerate Research Now 
Little research has been conducted on any method of climate 
engineering;192 only the United Kingdom and a project jointly supported by 
France, Germany, and Norway have begun concerted research efforts 
regarding climate engineering.193 Years of research and testing must be 
conducted before such technologies can be utilized responsibly.194 After 
completion of initial research, extensive modeling would be conducted of 
various approaches and their consequences.195 After these laboratory 
analyses were completed, scientists would perform limited field testing.196 
Some experts project that, combined, these steps might require a decade or 
longer.197 Accordingly, a research program focused on geoengineering 
technologies should commence as soon as possible, so that the risks are 
understood before the onset of catastrophic climate change.198 
                                                                                                                           
 192. See The Principles, OXFORD GEOENGINEERING PROGRAMME, available at 
http://www.geoengineering.ox.ac.uk/oxford-principles/principles/? (last visited Sept. 8, 
2013) [hereinafter The Principles] (“Research into geoengineering is at a very early 
stage . . . .”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND 
THE ENVIRONMENT); see also ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 5, at 52 (“[L]ittle research has 
actually so far been undertaken on most of the methods considered, despite a great deal of 
interest in recent years from the scientific and engineering community, from concerned 
citizens . . . and the media.”). 
 193. See Announcement: Oxford to Lead £1.3m Research Project on Geoengineering 
Governance, OXFORD GEOENGINEERING PROGRAM, 
http://www.geoengineering.ox.ac.uk/events/upcoming/?id=16 (last visited Sept. 8, 2013) 
(discussing University of Oxford’s research project on geoengineering governance) (on file 
with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT); 
Implications and Risks of Engineering Solar Radiation to Limit Climate Change, IMPLICC, 
http://implicc.zmaw.de/Home.551.0.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2013) (stating that the joint 
European program studied “novel options to limit climate change” from July 2009 to 
September 2012 and involved research institutions from France, Germany, and Norway) (on 
file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 194. See ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 5, at 52 (“Much more research on the feasibility, 
effectiveness, cost, environmental impact and potential unintended consequences of most 
methods would be required before they can be properly evaluated.”). 
 195. See id. at xii (“The principal research and development requirements in the short 
term are for much improved modeling studies and small/medium scale experiments (e.g. 
laboratory experiments and field trials).”). 
 196. See id. at 41 (cautioning that although there is a need for field trials to further 
geoengineering research, there is also a clear need for governance of large-scale field testing 
of some geoengineering techniques). 
 197. See Rob Swart & Natasha Marinova, Policy Options in a Worst Case Climate 
Change World, 15 MITIG. ADAPT. STRATEG. GLOB. CHANGE 531, 542 (2010) (predicting that 
SRM methods will likely require at least two decades from the commencement of research 
until they can achieve the desired effect). 
 198. See Davidson, supra note 117, at 4294–95 (stating that despite arguments against 
geoengineering, developing emergency mechanisms now is important to ensure they can be 
tested before they are actually needed). 
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Finally, a clarification: while this paper supports the immediate and 
extensive research and testing of climate engineering methodologies, this 
paper does not intend to suggest that geoengineering can, or should be, the 
sole solution to society’s climate change problems. We must mitigate. 
Nevertheless, barring an immediate commitment to a reduction in carbon 
emissions to nearly zero, we will not avoid a significant increase in global 
temperatures.199 Thus, at the very least, we should fully understand the 
implications of climate engineering should we need to reduce global 
temperatures immediately to avert a catastrophe.200 
 
III. International and Domestic Laws Do Not Provide a Uniform and 
Concerted Policy for the Regulation of Climate Engineering 
Neither domestic nor international law comprehensively governs 
climate engineering.201 Because existing environmental laws were drafted 
in a very different context in response to very different problems, at best 
they haphazardly address aspects of some climate engineering methods.202 
Moreover, several geoengineering methods fall completely outside of the 
contemplation of any of these provisions.203 Ultimately, this inconsistent 
coverage will complicate both the pursuit and regulation of climate 
engineering research. 
 
A. Domestic Environmental Laws 
In the United States, Congress passed environmental laws to 
address particular problems, such as polluted air and water, the cleanup of 
                                                                                                                           
 199. See Matthews & Caldeira, supra note 38, at 1 (“[T]o achieve atmospheric carbon 
dioxide levels that lead to climate stabilization, the net addition of CO2 to the atmosphere 
from human activities must be decreased to nearly zero.”). 
 200. See Albert C. Lin, Balancing the Risks: Managing Technology and Dangerous 
Climate Change, 8 ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 1, 12 (2009) (cautioning that, although 
climate engineering may allow society to “buy time for more gradual emissions reductions 
to be put in place and to take effect,” climate engineering’s adverse effects may not be 
immediately apparent) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, THE 
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 201. See BRACMORT & LATTANZIO, supra note 165, at 39 (stating that there is limited 
domestic oversight of and few international agreements governing geoengineering). 
 202. See id. at 24 (arguing that “some legal instruments may currently apply to 
domestic geoengineering practices,” but “the federal government could expand these 
existing laws to specifically address geoengineering activities or develop new laws”). 
 203. See id. at ii (“[P]olicymakers will also need to consider whether geoengineering 
can be effectively addressed by amendments to existing laws and international agreements 
or, alternatively, whether new laws and international treaties would need to be developed.”). 
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toxic chemicals, and the treatment of hazardous waste.204 These laws, 
passed in the 1970s and 1980s, predate most consideration of climate 
change, and, thus, precede any contemplation of climate engineering as a 
response.205 In some instances, these laws regulate aspects of particular 
climate engineering methods, but they do not provide a comprehensive 
scheme for the regulation of geoengineering research, testing, or 
deployment.206 Thus, most research and testing of geoengineering can 
proceed unregulated in the United States. However, a comprehensive 
scheme should be developed to promote their research and to regulate these 
efforts. 
The following discussion reviews the federal laws that might 
regulate climate engineering research and development. 
 
1. Safe Drinking Water Act 
The Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA)207 ensures the quality of the 
nation’s drinking water by authorizing the EPA to set drinking water 
quality standards and to oversee local authorities that implement those 
standards.208 Pursuant to its authority to protect underground water sources 
under the SDWA,209 the EPA regulates the geological sequestration of 
CO2.210 The SDWA authorizes the EPA to establish minimum standards for 
state underground injection control programs.211 In December 2010, the 
                                                                                                                           
 204. See Laws and Executive Orders, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://www2.epa.gov/laws-regulations/laws-and-executive-orders (last visited Sept. 9, 2013) 
(providing a summary of environmental laws) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE 
JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 205. See generally Richard J. Lazarus, The Greening of America and the Graying 
United States Environmental Laws: Reflections on Environmental Law’s First Three 
Decades in the United States, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J., 75 (2001) (discussing the evolution of 
environmental law in the United States, its origin during the 1970s and development during 
the 1980s). 
 206. See BRACMORT & LATTANZIO, supra note 165, at 25 (discussing federal agencies’ 
minimal efforts and funding with respect to the development and implementation of national 
geoengineering policies). 
 207. Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300f (2012). 
 208. See id. § 300g-2 (explaining the roles of the EPA and state regulators). 
 209. See id. § 300h-2 (authorizing the EPA to enforce regulations that protect 
underground sources of water). 
 210. See Federal Requirements Under the Unground Injection Control Program for 
Carbon Dioxide Geological Sequestration Wells, 75 Fed. Reg. 77,230, 77,235 (Dec. 10, 
2010) [hereinafter Class VI Rule] (to be codified at 44 C.F.R pts. 124, 144, 145, 146, and 
147) (“Part C of the SDWA requires EPA to establish minimum requirements for State UIC 
programs that regulate the subsurface injection of fluids onshore and offshore under 
submerged lands within the territorial jurisdiction of States.”). 
 211. See id. at 77,235 (“Part C of the SDWA requires EPA to establish minimum 
requirements for state UIC programs that regulate the subsurface injection on fluids onshore 
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EPA promulgated rules under the Underground Injection Control Program 
(UIC) of the SDWA.212 The 2010 rules provide for the development of a 
new class of wells, Class VI.213 This class builds upon existing UIC 
requirements with standards tailored to CO2 injection for long-term 
storage.214 Operators of Class VI wells must prepare assessments of the 
appropriateness of the location for CO2 sequestration,215 must follow certain 
well construction216 and operating requirements,217 must comply with 
testing and monitoring obligations to ensure the effectiveness of 
sequestration,218 must follow post-injection closure procedures,219 and must 
provide financial assurance for closing and remediating activities.220 Carbon 
dioxide itself is not a drinking water contaminant, but its presence in water 
                                                                                                                           
and offshore under submerged land within the territorial jurisdiction of the state.”); see also 
42 U.S.C. § 330h-1(b)(3) (stating that under the program, the EPA serves as the permitting 
authority until such time as a state applies for and is accepted for the role). 
 212. See id. at 77,230 (stating that the regulation would become effective on January 
10, 2011, one month after the EPA issued the regulation, on December 10, 2010). 
 213. See id. at 77,240 (discussing the proposal for a new class of injection wells, Class 
VI, as well as the technical criteria for permitting Class VI wells). 
 214. See Geologic Sequestration of Carbon Dioxide, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://water.epa.gov/type/groundwater/uic/wells_sequestration.cfm (last visited Oct. 15, 
2013) (“The Class VI rule builds on existing UIC Program requirements, with extensive 
tailored requirements that address carbon dioxide injection for long-term storage to ensure 
that wells used for geologic sequestration are appropriately sited, constructed, tested, 
monitored, funded, and closed.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF 
ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 215. See Class VI Rule, supra note 210, at 77,247 (“Today’s final action requires 
owners or operators of Class VI wells to perform a detailed assessment of the geologic, 
hydrogeologic, geochemical, and geomechanical properties of the proposed GS [Geologic 
Sequestration] site to ensure that GS wells are sited in appropriate locations and inject into 
suitable formations.”). 
 216. See id. at 77,250 (“Today’s final approach is based on existing construction 
requirements . . . for Class I hazardous waste injection wells, with modifications to address 
the unique physical characteristics of CO2.”). 
 217. See id. at 77,257 (“The requirements for operation of Class VI injection wells are 
based on the existing requirements for Class I wells, with enhancements to account for the 
unique conditions that will occur during GS including buoyancy, corrosivity, and higher 
sustained pressures over a longer period of operation.”). 
 218. See id. at 77,259 (“Today’s final rule . . . requires owners or operators of Class VI 
wells to develop and implement a comprehensive testing and monitoring plan . . . that 
includes injectate monitoring, corrosion monitoring of the well’s tubular, mechanical, and 
cement components, pressure fall-off testing, ground water quality monitoring . . . .”). 
 219. See id. at 77,266 (discussing the care required during the post-injection site period, 
in which the owner or operator of the Class VI well must continue monitoring to ensure the 
protection of underground sources of drinking water). 
 220. See id. at 77,268 (noting that owners or operators of Class VI wells must 
“demonstrate and maintain financial responsibility as approved by the Director for 
performing corrective action on wells . . . injection well plugging, PISC and site closure, and 
emergency and remedial response.”). 
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forms carbonic acid, which can cause metals or other contaminants to leach 
into ground water as a result of sequestration.221 The EPA deemed 
regulation appropriate also because of the large volumes of CO2 that may 
be injected, the mobility of CO2 within geologic formations, and potential 
impurities in the CO2 stream.222 
 
2. Clean Air Act 
Under the Clean Air Act (CAA),223 the EPA establishes primary 
and secondary standards for ambient air quality.224 The EPA sets the 
primary ambient air quality standards at a level to protect the public 
health;225 it sets the secondary standards to protect the public welfare.226 
Pursuant to this authority, the EPA identifies pollutants that can be 
reasonably expected to harm public health or welfare, and prescribes 
regulations to limit such pollutants accordingly.227 Through this authority, 
the CAA might affect climate engineering because the EPA has identified 
sulfur oxides as one such pollutant.228 As described previously, sulfur 
particles are the material of choice for SRM methods that propose to eject 
                                                                                                                           
 221. See id. (“While CO2 itself is not a drinking water contaminant, CO2 in the presence 
of water forms a weak acid, known as carbonic acid, that, in some instances, could cause 
leaching and mobilization of naturally-occurring metals or other contaminants from geologic 
formations into ground water.”). 
 222. See id. at 77,233 (“Due to the large CO2 injection volumes anticipated at GS 
projects, the relative buoyancy of CO2, its mobility within subsurface geologic formations, 
its corrosivity in the presence of water, and the potential presence of impurities in the 
captured CO2 stream, the Agency has determined that tailored requirements, modeled on the 
existing UIC regulatory framework, are necessary to manage the unique nature of CO2 
injection for GS.”). 
 223. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2012). 
 224. See id. § 7409(a)(1) (authorizing the EPA to establish a national primary ambient 
air quality standard and a national secondary ambient air quality standard). 
 225. See id. § 7409(b)(1) (“National primary ambient air quality standards . . . shall be 
ambient air quality standards the attainment and maintenance of which . . . are requisite to 
protect the public health.”). 
 226. See id. § 7409(b)(2) (“Any national secondary ambient air quality standard . . . 
shall specify a level of air quality the attainment and maintenance of which . . . is requisite to 
protect the public welfare from any known or anticipated adverse effects associated with the 
presence of such air pollutant in the ambient air.”). 
 227. See id. § 7408(a) (directing the EPA to identify pollutants which “may reasonably 
be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare” and to issue air quality criteria 
accordingly). 
 228. See Keith, Parson & Morgan, supra note 124, at 427 (“At one extreme, a state 
might decide that avoiding the effects of climate change on its people takes precedence over 
the environmental concerns of SRM and begin injecting sulphur into the stratosphere, with 
no prior risk assessment or international consultation.”). 
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these sulfur particles into the atmosphere229 because they mimic volcanic 
emissions of sulfur.230 Some analysts suggest, however, that particles other 
than those made of sulfur, such as titanium dioxide, may provide similar or 
better results.231 If titanium dioxide were used, this method would probably 
not trigger protections under the CAA, because the EPA has not identified 
titanium dioxide as a pollutant that threatens public health or welfare.232 
Carbon sequestration also implicates protections of the CAA: 
pursuant to its authority under the CAA, the EPA has promulgated 
reporting requirements concerning the release of CO2 from underground 
injection facilities established under the SDWA.233 The EPA promulgated 
these rules to enable it to monitor the growth and efficacy of geologic 
sequestration and to evaluate policy options.234 Pursuant to these 
regulations, facilities must prepare reports on the amounts of CO2 received, 
injected, and sequestered, and whether any CO2 has escaped through 
leakage.235 The EPA also requires that facilities develop and submit for its 
approval a monitoring, reporting, and verification plan.236 
 
                                                                                                                           
 229. See id. (discussing the use of sulfur particles in SRM). 
 230. See Davidson et al., supra note 117, at 4265 (“The choice of particle is receiving 
close attention; hitherto, it had been assumed that aerosols would be sulphuric acid mists 
similar to those produced by volcanoes.”). 
 231. See id. at 4266 (“If other particles are to be designed and manufactured . . . , they 
will need particular properties to be attractive alternatives to the use of a sulphuric acid 
aerosol. . . . Various high refractive index particle systems could be considered but titanium 
dioxide (TiO2) is a promising candidate.”). 
 232. See generally 40 C.F.R. pt. 50 (2013) (lacking a section that regulates titanium 
dioxide); see also What Are the Six Common Air Pollutants?, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/air/urbanair/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2013) (naming air pollutants that pose 
a risk to public health and welfare). 
 233. See generally 40 C.F.R. §§ 98.440–98.449 (establishing reporting requirements); 
see also Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases: Injection and Geologic Sequestration 
of Carbon Dioxide, 75 Fed. Reg. 75,060, 75,062 (Dec. 1, 2010) (“CAA section 114 provides 
EPA with the authority to require the information mandated by this rule because such data 
will inform and are relevant to EPA’s implementation of a wide variety of CAA 
provisions.”). 
 234. See Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases: Injection and Geologic 
Sequestration of Carbon Dioxide, 75 Fed. Reg. 75,060, 75,062 (Dec. 1, 2010) (noting that 
the data collected “will, among other things, inform Agency decisions under the CAA 
related to the use of carbon dioxide capture and geologic sequestration (CCS) for mitigating 
GHG emissions.”). 
 235. See generally 40 C.F.R. § 98.442 (2013) (“You must report: (a) Mass of CO2 
received[,] . . . injected into the subsurface[,] . . . produced[, and] . . . [m]ass of CO2 emitted 
by surface leakage[,] . . . equipment leaks[,] and vented emissions of CO2 from surface 
equipment located between the injection flow meter and the injection wellhead . . . [and] 
between the production flow meter and the production wellhead.”). 
 236. See 40 C.F.R. § 98.448 (2013) (mandating the submission and enumerating the 
requirements of a monitoring, reporting, and verification plan). 
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3. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act 
Congress passed the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)237 to provide broad federal 
authority to compel the cleanup of hazardous substances that may endanger 
human health or the environment238 and to ensure that responsible parties 
bear the costs.239 CERCLA defines “hazardous substance” to include any 
substance designated as such by the EPA, not only under CERCLA, but 
also under other environmental legislation.240 
In theory, CERCLA could apply to climate engineering through 
regulation of carbon sequestration.241 In practice, however, CERCLA is 
unlikely to have a direct effect on carbon sequestration.242 Even though CO2 
is not identified as a hazardous substance under CERCLA,243 the statute’s 
protections may be triggered if a CO2 stream contains a hazardous 




                                                                                                                           
 237. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2012). 
 238. See H.R. REP. NO. 1016(I), at 6119 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 
6119 (“The bill would . . . provide for a national inventory of inactive hazardous waste sites 
and . . . [would] establish a program for appropriate environmental response action to protect 
public health and the environment from the dangers posed by such sites.”). 
 239. See id. at 6120 (“[CERCLA] would also establish a federal cause of action in strict 
liability to enable the Administrator to pursue rapid recovery . . . from persons liable therefor 
and to induce such persons voluntarily to pursue appropriate environmental response actions 
with respect to inactive hazardous waste sites.”). 
 240. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (defining the term “hazardous substance” as it is defined 
by the EPA under CERCLA and other acts, such as the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 
the Toxic Substances Control Act, among others). 
 241. See Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Climate Change and Carbon 
Sequestration: Assessing a Liability Regime for Long-Term Storage of Carbon Dioxide, 58 
EMORY L.J. 103, 128–32 (2008) (discussing CERCLA’s potential application to carbon 
sequestration). 
 242. See id. at 130 (“Because CO2 is nontoxic at low concentrations and is not a listed 
waste, CERCLA likely does not apply to current CO2 injection activities unless recognized 
hazardous substances are present.”). 
 243. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (defining hazardous substance); see also Federal 
Requirements Under the Underground Injection Control Program for Carbon Dioxide 
Geologic Sequestration Wells, 75 Fed. Reg. 77,230, 77,260 (Dec. 1, 2010) (“CO2 itself is not 
listed as a hazardous substance under CERCLA.”). 
 244. See Federal Requirements Under the Underground Injection Control Program, 
supra note 244 (stating that CO2 could contain a hazardous substance or react with ground 
water and produce a hazardous substance). 
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4. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)245 provides 
“a comprehensive ‘cradle to grave’ regulatory system for identifying, 
listing, and tracking hazardous wastes; setting standards for the generation, 
handling, storage, and disposal of hazardous wastes . . . .”246 RCRA applies 
only to “solid wastes” that are also “hazardous wastes,”247 when considered 
in light of certain qualifying criteria.248 A solid waste is a hazardous waste 
if it exhibits one of these characteristics: ignitability, corrosivity, reactivity, 
and toxicity.249 
RCRA’s application to carbon sequestration would depend upon 
the presence of hazardous materials in CO2 streams,250 because CO2 is not a 
hazardous waste under RCRA.251 In most instances, however, the captured 
CO2 would contain some impurities.252 Although concentrations of these 
impurities would likely be very low,253 there would be a risk of 
contaminating underground sources of drinking water given the volume of 
CO2.254 Furthermore, the types and concentrations of impurities would vary 
by characteristics of the original source of the captured CO2, such as the 
nature of the facility, composition of the underlying material (coal, for 
example), plant operating conditions, and pollution removal 
technologies.255 Thus, operators would need to determine whether the CO2 
contains a hazardous material, and, if it did, they would need to inject the 
                                                                                                                           
 245. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k (2012). 
 246. Klass & Wilson, supra note 241, at 125. 
 247. See 40 C.F.R. § 261.3 (2013) (defining hazardous waste). 
 248. See id. § 261.11 (listing the criteria used to classify solid waste as hazardous). 
 249. See id. §§ 261.20–24 (describing the characteristics of ignitability, corrosivity, 
reactivity, and toxicity). 
 250. See Klass & Wilson, supra note 241, at 127 (“CO2 is not a listed hazardous waste, 
and it seems unlikely that CO2 alone would be considered a hazardous waste, although co-
injection with other waste stream constituents (e.g., hydrogen sulfide (H2S)) could cause it to 
be defined so.”). 
 251. See id. (stating that CO2 is not listed as a hazardous material). 
 252. See Federal Requirements Under the Underground Injection Control Program for 
Carbon Dioxide Geologic Sequestration Wells, 73 Fed. Reg. 43,492, 43,511 (July 25, 2008) 
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 144, 146) (“Another concern for [underground sources of 
drinking water] is the presence of impurities in the CO2 stream.”). 
 253. See id. (anticipating that any impurities would only be present in small amounts). 
 254. See id. (“Because of the volume of CO2 that could be injected, there may be a risk 
that co-contaminants in the CO2 stream could endanger [drinking water] . . . .”). 
 255. See id. at 43,503 (“[T]he types of impurities and their concentrations in the CO2 
stream are likely to vary by facility, coal composition, plant operating conditions, and 
pollution removal technologies . . . .”). 
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stream into Class I wells,256 as RCRA prohibits the injection of CO2 streams 
containing hazardous wastes into Class VI wells.257 
 
5. Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act 
The Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act (MPRSA)258 
implements the obligations of the United States under the 1972 London 
Convention.259 The MPRSA prohibits the transportation of any material for 
the purpose of dumping it260 into ocean waters “in the territorial sea or the 
contiguous zone of the United States.”261 The Act defines “material” to 
include solid, industrial, and other waste.262 Even then, a party may receive 
a permit from the EPA to dispose of materials other than dredged matter, 
radiological, chemical and biological warfare agents, or high-level 
radioactive or medical waste.263 The MPRSA applies to vessels carrying 
materials out of the United States, as well as vessels entering the territorial 
sea or the contiguous zone of the United States.264  
Besides regulating ocean dumping, the MPRSA also establishes a 
research program.265 Specifically, it establishes a monitoring and research 
program concerning the long-range effects of ocean dumping, pollution, 
and man-induced changes of ocean ecosystems.266 The MPRSA may 
                                                                                                                           
 256. See 40 C.F.R. § 262.11 (stating that an operator must determine if its solid waste is 
hazardous, and prescribing the process for making this determination); see generally 40 
C.F.R. § 146.5 (describing the purposes and uses of the different classes of wells). 
 257. See Federal Requirements Under the Underground Injection Control Program, 
supra note 244, at 43,503 (July 25, 2008) (indicating that the rule would preclude injecting 
hazardous waste into class VI wells). 
 258. Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401–45 (2012). 
 259. See Tracy D. Hester, Remaking the World to Save It: Applying U.S. Environmental 
Laws to Climate Engineering Projects, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 851, 886 (2011) (“The MPRSA 
implements the United States’ obligations under the London Convention . . . .”). 
 260. See 33 U.S.C. § 1411(a) (prohibiting vessels and aircraft from transporting 
material to dump it in ocean water). 
 261. Id. § 1401(c). 
 262. See id. § 1402(c) (“‘Material’ means . . . solid waste . . . industrial . . . and other 
waste.”). 
 263. See id. § 1412(a) (stating that no permit will be issued for “dredged material . . . 
radiological, chemical, and biological warfare agents, high-level radioactive, and medical 
waste”). 
 264. See id. § 1401(c) (stating that the act regulates both dumping materials taken out 
of the United States and materials brought into “the territorial sea or the contiguous zone of 
the United States”). 
 265. See id. § 1441 (stating that the Secretary of Commerce will establish a research 
program). 
 266. See id. §§ 1441–42 (stating that the Secretary of Commerce will create a research 
program to monitor “long-range effects of pollution, overfishing, and man-induced changes 
of ocean ecosystems”). 
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regulate climate engineering because fertilization of the ocean with iron 
could fall within its jurisdiction.267 A 2007 case regarding a company, 
Planktos, that planned to conduct an iron fertilization experiment, is 
illustrative.268 The EPA wrote to Planktos, informing it that if Planktos used 
a vessel flying an American flag, then the EPA might require a permit 
under the MPRSA for ocean dumping.269 Ocean fertilization techniques 
require adding only a very small amount of iron to the ocean.270 The statute 
prohibits the act of “dumping . . . into ocean waters.”271 The parties did not 
definitively resolve this issue, however, because Planktos decided to use 
another vessel, thereby removing its experiment from the jurisdiction of the 
MPRSA.272 
During the dispute, the United States submitted an agenda item to 
the parties of the London Convention and the Protocol Secretariat regarding 
Planktos and the extension of the Convention to fertilization efforts.273 In 
November 2007, the parties to the Convention concluded that it covers 
ocean fertilization.274 The Contracting Parties also “urged states to use the 
                                                                                                                           
 267. See Kelly Hearn, Plan to Dump Iron in Ocean as Climate Fix Attracts Debate, 
NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC NEWS (July 25, 2007), 
news.nationalgeographic.com/news/pf/59308315.html (indicating that the EPA believes 
dumping iron into the ocean might require a permit under the MPRSA) (on file with the 
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 268. See ELI KINTISCH, HACK THE PLANET 129 (2010) (describing Planktos’s plan to 
sprinkle iron in the ocean); see id (stating that iron increases plankton growth and the 
plankton convert CO2 into carbon stored in the plant tissue). 
 269. See Hearn, supra note 267 (stating that the EPA informed Planktos it may need a 
permit even though it was unsure if fertilization would be subject to the act). 
 270. See KINTISCH, supra note 268, at 129 (stating “minute” levels of iron will be added 
to the ocean under Planktos’s plan); Steven Mufson, Iron to Plankton to Carbon Credits, 
WASH. POST (July 20, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/07/19/AR2007071902553_pf.html (describing the process of 
fertilization and stating that the ratio of iron dust inserted into ocean water is comparable to a 
teaspoon of iron added to the water in an Olympic-size pool) (on file with the WASHINGTON 
AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 271. 33 U.S.C. § 1411(a) (2012); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1410(f) (defining “dumping” 
somewhat vaguely as “a disposition of material,” which should contemplate the fertilization 
of the sea with iron nutrients). 
 272. See KINTISCH, supra note 268, at 137 (explaining that Planktos chose not to use a 
United States vessel in order to avoid EPA regulations). 
 273. See Tatjana K. Rosen, Environmental Governance on the High Seas: A Case Study 
of Emerging Uses and Environmental Leadership 3 (undated) (unpublished manuscript 
presented at the Conference on Environmental Governance and Democracy, May 10–11, 
2008, Yale Univ.), available at http://envirocenter.yale.edu/envdem/documents.htm#track22 
(stating that the United States submitted an agenda item because of its apprehension with 
Planktos’s use of a United States vessel) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL 
OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 274. See Press Release: Large-Scale Fertilization Operations Not Currently Justified, 
Say Parties to International Treaties, International Maritime Organization (Nov. 16, 2007), 
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utmost caution when considering proposals for large-scale fertilization 
operations . . . .”275 In 2008, the parties adopted a resolution to expand the 
London Convention and the London Protocol to allow ocean fertilization 
for research purposes.276 
Because of its focus on ocean dumping, rather than subseabed 
burial, of “wastes,” the MPRSA appears to have little applicability to 
carbon sequestration efforts.277 First, the targeting of ocean dumping should 
render it inapplicable to efforts to sequester carbon since that involves 
injecting the fluid under the seabed.278 Second, for the MPRSA to extend to 
subseabed injections, it would need to regulate the particular material, CO2, 
being injected.279 This is doubtful. As previously noted, the MPRSA 
regulates the dumping of waste.280 While the MPRSA does not define 
“waste” generally, it defines “industrial waste” as any “solid, semisolid, or 
liquid waste generated by a manufacturing or processing plant.”281 Since 
CO2 captured for sequestration is captured as a gas and not as a solid or a 
liquid,282 it likely does not fall within this definition. 
 
                                                                                                                           
available at 
http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Environment/SpecialProgrammesAndInitiatives/Pages/Londo
n-Convention-and-Protocol.aspx (“Parties . . . say that planned operations for large-scale 
fertilization of the oceans using micro-nutrients—for example, iron—to sequester carbon 
dioxide (CO2), are currently not justified.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL 
OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT); Davis, supra note 154, at 934 (stating that 
the London Convention covered and competently addressed ocean fertilization). 
 275. Davis, supra note 154, at 934. 
 276. See infra at Part III.B.1 (discussing the London Convention). 
 277. See Thomas Brugato, The Property Problem: A Survey of Federal Options for 
Facilitating Acquisition of Carbon Sequestration Repositories, 29 VA. ENVT’L L.J. 305, 352 
(2011) (“[T]he MPRSA . . . does not appear to cover sub-seabed activities.”). 
 278. See id. at 352 (stating the MPRSA does not cover subseabed activity); see also 
Ann Brewster Weeks, Subseabed Carbon Dioxide Sequestration as a Climate Mitigation 
Option for the Eastern United States: A Preliminary Assessment of Technology and Law, 12 
OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 245, 264 (2007) (noting that the MPRSA’s only reference to the 
subseabed excludes it from the definition of “dumping,” the act which triggers coverage by 
the act). But see Sumit Som, Creating Safe and Effective Carbon Sequestration, 17 N.Y.U. 
ENVT’L L.J. 961, 976–77 (2008) (arguing that the leaking of sequestered CO2 could harm the 
marine environment, thus justifying application of the MPRSA to subseabed sequestration). 
 279. See Brugato, supra note 277, at 352 (noting that courts have not ruled on the 
question and that the London Convention leaves the question uncertain). 
 280. See 33 U.S.C. § 1411(a) (prohibiting vessels and ircraft from transporting material 
in order to dump it in the ocean water). 
 281. 33 U.S.C. § 1412a(b). 
 282. See PETER FOLGER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42532, CARBON CAPTURE AND 
SEQUESTRATION (CCS): A PRIMER 2 (2013), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42532.pdf (describing the process of carbon sequestration) 
(on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT). 
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6. Endangered Species Act 
Congress passed the Endangered Species Act (ESA)283 to protect 
endangered and threatened species of plants and animals, as well as the 
ecosystems upon which those species rely.284 The ESA has two major 
provisions which may be pertinent to the regulation of geoengineering.285 
First, Section VII prohibits a federal agency from taking actions that might 
jeopardize a listed species.286 To this end it requires an agency to consult 
with the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) or the National Marine Fisheries 
Service (NMFS)287 to determine whether the contemplated agency action 
might jeopardize a protected species.288 Section VII extends to all activities 
authorized, funded, or carried out by a federal agency.289 Second, Section 
IX prohibits any person from “taking” any protected species.290 The ESA 
defines “take” to mean, inter alia, harass, harm, wound, kill, or collect;291 
the regulations define “harm” to include significant habitat modification.292  
The ESA is likely to have limited and uneven application to climate 
engineering efforts. Because “taking” a listed species is necessary to trigger 
                                                                                                                           
 283. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–44 (2012). 
 284. See id. § 1531(b) (“The purposes of this chapter are to provide a means whereby 
the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may be 
conserved, to provide a program for the conservation of such endangered species and 
threatened species . . . .”). 
 285. See id. §§ 1536(a), 1538(a)(1) (making it unlawful to endanger or take any listed 
species). 
 286. See id. § 1536(a)(2) (stating that all agencies must ensure that any action they take 
will not jeopardize an endangered species unless the agency receives an exemption); 
§ 1533(a) (listing the factors used to determine whether a species is endangered or 
threatened). 
 287. See Interagency Cooperation—Endangered Species Act of 1973, as Amended, 50 
C.F.R. § 402.01(b) (2013) (stating that these two agencies share responsibility for 
administering §§ 1536(a), 1538(a)). 
 288. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (“Each Federal agency shall . . . insure that any 
action . . . is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or 
threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such 
species . . . .”). 
 289. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (identifying as examples of such activities the following: 
promulgation of regulations; granting of contracts, leases, or permits; or causing 
modifications to land, water, or air). 
 290. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (stating it is unlawful to take any listed species). 
 291. See id. § 1532(19) (“The term ‘take’ means to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, 
wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct.”). 
 292. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2013) 
(“Harm . . . may include significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually 
kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including 
breeding, feeding, or sheltering.”). But see 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(A)–(B) (allowing the 
FWS to permit a taking for scientific purposes or when incidental to a lawful activity). 
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the statute’s protections,293 the ESA may restrict climate engineering only 
where such species are harassed, harmed, wounded, or killed.294 For 
instance, one geoengineering proposal involves placing reflective materials 
over desert landscapes to reflect solar radiation.295 This method may not be 
acceptable where a listed species lives, if it results in injury to listed 
species.296 Of course, other technologies with generalized effects may be 
barred. For example, if sulfate aerosols, wherever emitted, were determined 
to threaten a particular listed species of bird, then this would support a 
complete ban on the method.297 
If a certain method does, in fact, affect a listed species, an 
additional ground for ESA application may arise. Section 1536(a)(2) 
requires that a federal agency consult with the appropriate authority any 
time the agency is considering an action that may jeopardize a listed 
species.298 Thus, if climate engineering involves agency action—whether it 
is participation in an experiment, provision of funding, or licensing and 
permitting—the agency must first consult with FWS or NMFS about the 
implications for listed species.299 In the future, §1536(a)(2) may be 
implicated by most climate engineering efforts. Consequently, this suggests 
one means by which the federal government might play a larger role in the 
future. 
 
7. National Environmental Policy Act 
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)300 mandates the 
preparation of a detailed environmental impact statement (EIS) whenever a 
federal agency proposes “legislation and other major Federal actions 
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.”301 Such 
“major Federal action” includes partial or complete financing of both 
                                                                                                                           
 293. See generally 16 U.S.C. §§ 1538, 1540 (describing prohibited actions “with 
respect to any endangered species of fish or wildlife listed pursuant to section 1533” that 
may result in a civil penalty). 
 294. See id. § 1532(19). 
 295. See Irvine et al., supra note 120, at 2 (describing desert albedo geoengineering). 
 296. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2013). 
 297. See Hester, supra note 259, at 888 (discussing protection of birds and possible 
limitations on atmospheric methods under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act). 
 298. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (“Each Federal agency shall . . . insure that any 
action . . . is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or 
threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such 
species . . . .”). 
 299. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.01(b) (giving the Fish and Wildlife Service and National 
Marine Fisheries Service power to administer the act). 
 300. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321–4347 (2012). 
 301. Id. § 4332(C). 
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nonfederal and agency projects.302 An EIS is a detailed written statement 
that addresses the environmental impact of the proposed action, alternatives 
to the action, and any irretrievable commitments of resources.303 Moreover, 
NEPA mandates that the agency preparing the EIS shall seek comments 
from any federal agency with jurisdiction regarding the environmental 
impact of the action as well as comments from the public.304 
NEPA, however, is merely a procedural statute.305 It “does not 
mandate particular results.”306 Instead, it requires only “that the agency, in 
reaching its decision, will have available, and will carefully consider, 
detailed information concerning significant environmental impacts.”307 As a 
result, NEPA can be a powerful yet impotent force in regulating climate 
engineering efforts. NEPA can be powerful because it forces federal 
agencies to evaluate potential alternatives308 and to provide public notice of 
all government-sponsored projects that affect the quality of the human 
environment.309 On the other hand, NEPA provides no means to prevent 
implementation of these proposals.310 Indeed, courts long have recognized 
that the remedy for a violation of NEPA is merely compliance with the 
procedural requirements of the statute.311 A party cannot use a failure to 
comply with NEPA as a means to stop a proposed action permanently.312 
                                                                                                                           
 302. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18(a) (“Actions include new and continuing activities, 
including projects and programs entirely or partly financed, assisted, conducted, regulated, 
or approved by federal agencies . . . .”). 
 303. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (listing environmental impact, adverse effects of 
implementation, alternatives, and irretrievable commitment of resources as required 
elements of a statement). 
 304. See 40 CFR § 1503.1(a) (requiring comment on the draft environmental impact 
statement from the public and the federal agency with jurisdiction before submitting a final 
environmental impact statement). 
 305. See Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 23 (2008) 
(“NEPA imposes only procedural requirements . . . .”). 
 306. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989). 
 307. Id. at 349. 
 308. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (requiring an agency to describe alternatives to the 
proposed action). 
 309. See 40 CFR § 1506.6(b) (“Agencies shall: . . . [p]rovide public notice of NEPA-
required hearings, public meetings, and the availability of environmental documents so as to 
inform those persons and agencies who may be interested or affected.”). 
 310. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 23 (discussing NEPA as a procedural statute that merely 
requires agencies to contemplate consequences of their action before the action is 
implemented). 
 311. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 
U.S. 519, 558 (1978) (“NEPA does set forth significant substantive goals for the Nation, but 
its mandate to the agencies is essentially procedural. . . . Administrative decisions should be 
set aside . . . only for substantial procedural or substantive reasons as mandated by statute.”). 
 312. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 23 (concluding that NEPA ensures “that the agency, in 
reaching its decision, will have available, and will carefully consider, detailed information 
concerning significant environmental impacts” (internal quotations omitted)). 
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Moreover, NEPA requirements take effect only when the proposed action 
implicates a federal agency.313 Absent such involvement, NEPA cannot 
compel any action.314 
 
8. Clean Water Act 
The Clean Water Act (CWA)315 seeks to restore the integrity of the 
nation’s waters316 by eliminating the discharge of pollutants into them.317 
The CWA seeks to achieve this goal primarily by requiring a permit for the 
discharge of any pollutant by point sources.318 
The CWA is unlikely to impede climate engineering for several 
reasons. Iron fertilization involves the growth of plankton in water,319 and 
oceans, not lakes or rivers, provide the best waters for such efforts,320 but 
CWA jurisdiction does not extend to these waters.321 On the other hand, the 
CWA is consistent with geoengineering. Wetlands serve as efficient sources 
of carbon sequestration.322 The CWA protects wetlands by requiring 
permits for activities that would harm wetlands.323 Climate engineering 
efforts would favor the protection and increase of wetlands. Therefore, the 
                                                                                                                           
 313. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18 (requiring control by a federal agency as part of the 
definition of an action). 
 314. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 15–16 (stating that NEPA applies when federal agencies 
take a “major Federal actio[n] significantly affecting the quality of the human environment” 
(internal quotations omitted)). 
 315. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012). 
 316. See id. § 1251(a) (“The objective of this chapter is to restore and maintain the 
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”). 
 317. See id. § 1251(a)(1) (“[I]t is the national goal that the discharge of pollutants into 
the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985 . . . .”). 
 318. See id. § 1342(a)(1) (stating the procedure and conditions for obtaining a permit to 
discharge pollutants); see also id. § 1313 (amending the CWA to require states to implement 
water quality standards). 
 319. See Randall S. Abate & Andrew B. Greenlee, Sowing Seeds Uncertain: Ocean 
Iron Fertilization, Climate Change, and the International Environmental Law Framework, 
27 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 555, 560 (2010) (“[I]ron fertilization involves adding iron to the sea 
to artificially stimulate the rapid growth of phytoplankton.”). 
 320. See id. at 559 (“[O]cean iron fertilization activities generally take place on the high 
seas.”). 
 321. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7)–(8) (defining “navigable waters” of the United States to 
include the “territorial seas” that extend seaward a distance of only three miles). 
 322. See Blanca Bernal & William J. Mitsch, Comparing Carbon Sequestration in 
Temperate Freshwater Wetland Communities, 18 GLOBAL CHANGE BIOLOGY 1636, 1636 
(2012) (describing wetlands’ capacity as significant carbon sinks). 
 323. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (authorizing the Secretary to issue permits). 
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CWA is consistent with these objectives,324 and such geoengineering efforts 
would not conflict with the CWA. 
 
B. International Environmental Laws 
Like domestic law, most international treaties are targeted to the 
control of pollution.325 Even those international laws that regulate some 
aspect of climate engineering research and deployment will have limited 
impact on efforts conducted in the United States.326 Although the United 
States has signed some of these agreements, it has not ratified most of them, 
and consequently, is not bound by their terms.327 
 
1. Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes 
and Other Matter 
The Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping 
of Wastes and Other Matter (London Convention)328 became available for 
signature in 1972 and entered into force in 1975.329 The United States is a 
signatory to the London Convention.330 
As noted previously, the United States implements its obligations 
under the London Convention through the MPRSA.331 The London 
Convention requires parties “to take all practicable steps to prevent the 
pollution of the sea by the dumping of waste and other matter.”332 In its 
definition of “dumping,” however, the London Convention excludes the 
                                                                                                                           
 324. See id. § 1251(a) (“The objective of this chapter is to restore and maintain the 
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”). 
 325. See Davis, supra note 154, at 930–31 (stating that it is a principle of international 
law to prevent pollution). 
 326. See Brugato, supra note 277, at 347–52 (discussing the lack of international 
treaties on domestic efforts at sequestration). 
 327. See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 505 (2008) (“While treaties ‘may comprise 
international commitments . . . they are not domestic law unless Congress has either enacted 
implementing statutes or the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be “self-executing” and 
is ratified on these terms.’” (quoting Iguartua-De La Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 
150 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Boudin, C.J.))). 
 328. Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and 
Other Matter, opened for signature Dec. 29, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403, [hereinafter London 
Convention], available at 
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201046/volume-1046-I-15749-
English.pdf. 
 329. See Brugato, supra note 277, at 349 (“The London Convention was opened for 
signature in 1972 and entered into force in 1975.”). 
 330. See id. (stating the United States is one of eighty-five parties to the Convention). 
 331. See Hester, supra note 259 and accompanying text. 
 332. London Convention, supra note 328, art. I. 
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“placement of matter for a purpose other than the mere disposal thereof, 
provided that such placement is not contrary to the aims of this 
Convention.”333  
In 1996, the parties to the London Convention adopted the Protocol 
to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution (London Protocol) 
to update and supersede the London Convention.334 The London Protocol 
permits subseabed sequestration of carbon.335 As of May 2012, forty-two 
countries have joined as parties to the Protocol; the United States is not yet 
a party to the agreement.336 
In 2008, the contracting parties to the London Convention and 
London Protocol adopted nonbinding Resolution LC-LP.1 (2008) on the 
Regulation of Ocean Fertilization (Resolution).337 The Resolution expands 
the London Convention and the London Protocol to include ocean 
fertilization.338 It further provides that “ocean fertilization activities other 
than legitimate scientific research should not be allowed.”339 The 
Resolution considers non-research activities to be contrary to the London 
Convention and Protocol and not exempt from the definition of dumping.340 
Research projects should be assessed case-by-case in conjunction with an 
                                                                                                                           
 333. Id. at art. III, ¶ 1(b)(ii). 
 334. See Carbon Capture and Storage Unit, Int’l Energy Agency, Carbon Capture and 
Storage and the London Protocol 10 (2011) (Int’l Energy Agency Working Paper), available 
at http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/CCS_London_Protocol.pdf 
(explaining that the London Protocol was meant to replace the London Convention) (on file 
with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 335. See Brugato, supra note 277, at 351 (describing how the parties of the London 
Protocol effectively allowed for subseabed sequestration by adopting an amendment to 
Annex I in 2006). 
 336. See INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION, 1996 PROTOCOL TO THE LONDON 
CONVENTION 1972: OVERVIEW OF CONTRACTING STATES (2012), available at 
http://www.imo.org/OurWork/Environment/SpecialProgrammesAndInitiatives/Pages/Londo
n-Convention-and-Protocol.aspx (providing a list of the parties to the London Protocol, and 
noting that the United States is a signatory, but not a party) (on file with the WASHINGTON 
AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 337. See Resolution LC-LP.1 (2008) on the Regulation of Ocean Fertilization, adopted 
Oct. 31, 2008, IMO Doc. LC30/16, Annex 6 [hereinafter LC-LP.1], available at 
http://www.imo.org/blast/blastData.asp?doc_id=14101&filename=1.doc%E2%80%8E.  
 338. See id. ¶ 1 (stating that “the scope of the London Convention and Protocol 
includes ocean fertilization activities”); see also Till Markus & Harald Ginzky, Regulating 
Climate Engineering: Paradigmatic Aspects of the Regulation of Ocean Fertilization, 5 
CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 477, 480 (2011) (describing why the contracting parties came to 
adopt the nonbinding LC-LP.1 resolution). 
 339. LC-LP.1, supra note 337, ¶ 1. 
 340. See id. ¶ 8 (stating that activities other than scientific research “should be 
considered as contrary to the aims of the Convention and Protocol”). 
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Assessment Framework.341 This Framework requires a “scientific quality 
check and environmental impact assessment.”342 
Therefore, these agreements bind the United States to restrict ocean 
fertilization activities to scientific research but allow carbon sequestration 
under the sea. 
 
2. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of 
Environmental Modification Techniques 
The Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other 
Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD)343 is a 
binding treaty targeted to weather manipulation.344 ENMOD arose in part as 
a response to efforts by the United States during the Vietnam War to use 
cloud seeding to gain military advantage.345 Although only seventy-four 
nations are parties to the convention, these parties include most of the 
world’s major economies.346 The United States ratified the treaty in 1979.347 
Under ENMOD, each party “undertakes not to engage in military 
or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having 
widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, 
damage or injury to any other State Party.”348 Several relevant points 
become apparent from this statement. First, the drafters targeted ENMOD 
to address militaristic or hostile efforts.349 Second, ENMOD pertains to 
environmental modification that serves as the “means of destruction, 
                                                                                                                           
 341. See Markus & Ginzky, supra note 341, at 480 (listing a summary of the 
requirements of LC-LP.1). 
 342. Id. at 481. 
 343. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of 
Environmental Modification Techniques, opened for signature May 18, 1977, 31 U.S.T. 333 
[hereinafter ENMOD]. 
 344. See id. at 335 (“Desiring to prohibit effectively military or any other hostile use of 
environmental modification techniques.”). 
 345. See Davis, supra note 154, at 935–36 (describing how the United States “injected 
silver iodide flares into clouds” over the Ho Chi Minh Trail to increase rainfall and reduce 
the ability of the North Vietnamese to transport troops and material, and stating that 
ENMOD was enacted “in response to these ‘weather warfare’ efforts”). 
 346. See Catherine Redgwell, Geoengineering the Climate: Technological Solutions to 
Mitigation—Failure or Continuing Carbon Addiction?, 2 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 178, 
183 (2011) (“The treaty enjoys only limited participation, with 74 State Parties, though it 
should be observed that this includes most major economies . . . .”). 
 347. See ENMOD, 343 note 342, at 333 (“The President of the United States of 
America ratified the Convention on December 13, 1979, in pursuance of the advice and 
consent of the Senate.”). 
 348. Id. at 336. 
 349. See id. (stating that parties to the treaty cannot use military or hostile 
“environmental modification techniques”). 
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damage or injury.”350 While some climate engineering technologies may 
create disparate effects across the globe,351 the motivation for their use is 
benevolent rather than hostile.352 Moreover, ENMOD recognizes that 
“environmental modification techniques for peaceful purposes could . . . 
contribute to the preservation and improvement of the environment for the 
benefit of present and future generations.”353 Thus, ENMOD appears 
inapplicable to geoengineering for the purpose of improving the 
environment.354 Finally, even if it were applicable, at least one major gap 
exists in its coverage: ENMOD addresses state action.355 However, as 
discussed previously, some climate engineering methods are sufficiently 
inexpensive that one or more private individuals could fully finance 
them.356 
 
3. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration 
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies 
In 1967 the United Nations’ Committee on the Peaceful Uses of 
Outer Space developed the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of 
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and 
                                                                                                                           
 350. Id. 
 351. See Michael C. MacCracken, Geoengineering: Worthy of Cautious Evaluation?, 
77 CLIMATIC CHANGE 235, 238–39 (2006) (noting that “climate” is actually a “mathematical 
construct created by averaging weather,” and ENMOD might prohibit geoengineering for 
climate change because a plan implemented by a few countries may affect several others, 
creating hostility). But see Rob Gurto, What’s the Difference Between Weather and 
Climate?, NASA (Feb. 1, 2005), http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/noaa-
n/climate/climate_weather.html (recognizing that climate and weather pertain to different 
periods of time, which may weaken MacCracken’s argument that relies on the similarities 
between weather and climate) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, 
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 352. See ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 5, at 1 (explaining that geoengineering projects 
are focused on mitigating the effects of, and adaptation to, climate change). 
 353. ENMOD, supra note 343, at 336. 
 354. See id. at 335 (“[E]nvironmental modification techniques for peaceful purposes 
could . . . contribute to the preservation and improvement of the environment for the benefit 
of present and future generations.”). 
 355. See id. (including only “State Parties” in the provisions and requirements of the 
convention). 
 356. See Burns, supra note 142 (claiming that even a single state or private individual 
could finance climate engineering projects). 
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Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty).357 The United States Senate 
ratified the Outer Space Treaty shortly after it was opened for signature.358 
The Outer Space Treaty arose in response to the Cold War and the 
resulting “Space Race.”359 Because of the concerns of the day, the Outer 
Space Treaty sought mainly to prevent the use of outer space as a base for 
military operations and to avoid military conflict regarding space.360 For 
these reasons, the Outer Space Treaty is especially focused on the peaceful 
and beneficial use of space.361 Thus, the Outer Space Treaty’s preamble 
notes that the parties desire outer space to be used for peaceful purposes,362 
and Article I notes that space exploration should be carried out for the 
benefit of all countries.363 
While the Outer Space Treaty primarily seeks to ensure the 
peaceful exploration and use of space,364 which would be consistent with 
space-based climate engineering proposals,365 it also addresses liability for 
                                                                                                                           
 357. Treaty on the Principles Governing the Activities of the States in the Exploration 
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for 
signature Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].  
 358. See id. at 2410 (listing the dates when the treaty was formed (Jan. 27, 1967) and 
ratified by the United States (Oct. 10, 1967)).  
 359. See Matthew Johnshoy, Note, The Final Frontier and a Guano Islands Act for the 
Twenty-First Century: Reaching for the Stars Without Reaching for the Stars, 37 J. CORP. L. 
717, 723 (2012) (“This treaty was adopted during the height of the Cold War under the 
intense pressures of the race to the moon.”); see also Vladimír Kopal, Treaty on Principles 
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the 
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies: Introduction, UNITED NATIONS AUDIOVISUAL LIBRARY OF 
INT’L LAW (2008), http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/tos/tos.html (explaining the history of 
the development of the Outer Space Treaty under the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of 
Outer Space) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND 
THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 360. See Blake Gilson, Note, Defending Your Client’s Property Rights in Space: A 
Practical Guide for the Lunar Litigator, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1367, 1369 (2011) (describing 
the main concerns behind the Outer Space Treaty relating to potential military development 
and conflict). 
 361. See Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks at the Signing of the Treaty on Outer Space 
(Jan. 27, 1967), available at 
http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/speeches.hom/670127.asp (“This treaty 
means that the moon and our sister planets will serve only the purposes of peace and not 
war.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT). 
 362. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 357, at 2411 (“Recognizing the common 
interest of mankind in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes . . . .”). 
 363. See id. at 2412 (“The exploration of outer space . . . shall be carried out for the 
interests of all countries . . . .”). 
 364. See id. at 2411, 2413, 2418 (noting that the treaty encourages peaceful use and 
exploration of outer space). 
 365. See ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 5, at 40 (explaining that the Outer Space Treaty 
would require use of climate engineering technologies that would not interfere with 
“peaceful exploration and use of outer space”). 
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space-based activities.366 Specifically, Article VII provides for liability for 
damage by an object launched into space.367 The Outer Space Treaty 
extends liability to damage occurring in the atmosphere or outer space.368 
While not necessarily a limit on geoengineering, it may be argued that this 
provision imposes liability for damage that such technologies cause.369 The 
terms of this provision, however, suggest that the intent of the drafters was 
to address direct physical damage, such as a collision in space or the 
atmosphere, caused by launched objects.370 Although the Outer Space 
Treaty extends liability to damage caused in Earth’s atmosphere, it appears 
not to cover the emission of sulfur or other particles.371 The Outer Space 
Treaty is targeted to objects that are launched with the intent of entering 
outer space.372 SRM methods, however, propose to emit particles into the 
stratosphere, rather than outer space.373 
                                                                                                                           
 366. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 357, at 2415 (including the obligations of State 
Parties in article VI and liabilities of these parties in article VII). 
 367. See id. (“Each State Party to the Treaty that launches or procures the launching of 
an object into outer space . . . is internationally liable for damage to another State Party to 
the Treaty . . . .”). 
 368. See id. (describing liability for damage as extending to damage “in air space or in 
outer space”). 
 369. See Ralph Bodle et al., The Regulatory Framework for Climate-Related 
Geoengineering Relevant to the Convention on Biological Diversity 99, 132 (Convention on 
Biological Diversity, Technical Series No. 66, 2012), available at 
http://www.cbd.int/doc/publications/cbd-ts-66-en.pdf (stating that article VII may create 
liability if one can prove an “adequate level of causation” between the geoengineering 
technique and the damage) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, 
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 370. See Eilene Galloway, The United States and the 1967 Treaty on Outer Space, in 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTIETH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 18, 26 (1998) 
(stating that United States Ambassador Arthur Goldberg testified before the Senate about the 
treaty and how article VII only covers “damage caused by an impact of a space vehicle or 
object”). 
 371. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 357, at 2415 (providing that states will be 
liable for damages to other states if they launch an object which causes damage to property 
of other states, whether in the air or in space). 
 372. See Science: Ozone Basics, STRATOSPHERIC OZONE: MONITORING AND RESEARCH 
IN NOAA, http://www.ozonelayer.noaa.gov/science/basics.htm (last updated Mar. 20, 2008) 
(defining the stratosphere as the section of Earth’s atmosphere that is between ten and thirty 
miles above the Earth’s surface) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF 
ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT); Joseph S. Imburgia, Space Debris and Its 
Threat to National Security: A Proposal for a Binding International Agreement to Clean Up 
the Junk, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 589, 612 (2011) (describing the popular, unofficial 
standard that Earth’s atmosphere ends, and outer space begins, 100 kilometers above Earth’s 
surface). 
 373. See, e.g., Paul J. Crutzen, Albedo Enhancement by Stratospheric Sulfur Injections: 
A Contribution to Resolve a Policy Dilemma?, 77 CLIMATIC CHANGE 211, 212 (2006) 
(describing a proposal to inject sulfur into the stratosphere); ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 5, 
at 26 (explaining cloud-albedo enhancement).  
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4. Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution Treaty for Europe and North 
America 
The Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution Treaty for Europe 
and North America (LRTAP)374 was developed in 1979 in response to acid 
rain.375 The LRTAP addresses the international implications of acid rain.376 
Three Protocols to the Treaty regulate sulfur emissions.377 
As its title indicates, the LRTAP is targeted to the reduction and 
prevention of air pollution.378 Nevertheless, its definition of “air pollution” 
may be broad enough to extend to some aerosol particle methods: “the 
introduction . . . of substances . . . into the air resulting in deleterious effects 
of such a nature as to endanger human health, [and] harm living resources 
and ecosystems . . . .”379 Although climate engineers would argue that their 
actions are not intended to endanger humans or ecosystems,380 without 
further research into potential damage, the LRTAP appears to restrict 
sulfate aerosols.381 
 
5. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer 
The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer 
(Vienna Convention)382 arose in response to concerns that humans produced 
                                                                                                                           
 374. Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, opened for signature 
Nov. 13, 1979, 34 U.S.T. 3044 [hereinafter LRTAP]. 
 375. See Amy A. Fraenkel, Comment, The Convention on Long-Range Transboundary 
Air Pollution: Meeting the Challenge of International Cooperation, 30 HARV. INT’L L.J. 447, 
449 (1989) (explaining that acid rain was the impetus for LRTAP). 
 376. See id. at 95 (“The problem required an international response and led eventually 
to the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution.”). 
 377. See Redgwell, supra note 346, at 185 (explaining that LRTAP has several 
protocols, two of which regulate sulfur emissions). 
 378. See LRTAP, supra note 374, at 3046 (“The Contracting Parties . . . are determined 
to . . . gradually reduce and prevent air pollution including long-range transboundary air 
pollution.”). 
 379. Id. at 3046.  
 380. See ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 5, at 1 (discussing the goals of geoengineering 
proposals to reduce the effects of climate change). 
 381. See Status of the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution and its 
Related Protocols, UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMM’N FOR EUROPE (Sept. 11, 2013), 
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/documents/2013/air/1convention_status_2pager_
7May2013_rev.pdf (listing subsequent protocols to the LRTAP, including the 1985 and 
1994 protocols, which limit sulfur emissions, and noting that the United States did not sign 
or ratify these protocols) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, 
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 382. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, opened for signature 
Mar. 22, 1985, T.I.A.S. No. 11097, 1 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].  
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chemicals that would reduce the planet’s ozone layer.383 The Vienna 
Convention opened for signature in 1985.384 Two years later the Montreal 
Protocol on Substances that Deplete Ozone Layer (Montreal Protocol) 
opened for signature.385 Parties to the Vienna Convention agree to reduce 
activities that would adversely impact the ozone layer.386 The Montreal 
Protocol requires reductions in the production and consumption of certain 
controlled substances.387  
The Vienna Convention and Montreal Protocol target their 
regulations to materials that harm the ozone layer.388 Thus, they likely 
would apply to aerosol injection methods that would adversely impact the 
ozone layer.389 Sulfur, the most prominent ingredient for atmospheric 
injections, reacts with chlorine in cold temperatures to form molecules that 
destroy ozone.390 Scientists have calculated that injecting sulfur into the 
atmosphere to the extent required to engineer the climate would seriously 
impact the ozone levels at the poles.391 Thus, the use of sulfur particles 
likely would violate the Vienna Convention and Montreal Protocol. Sulfur 
                                                                                                                           
 383. See Edith Brown Weiss, Introductory Note: The Vienna Convention for the 
Protection of the Ozone Layer and the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the 
Ozone Layer, UNITED NATIONS AUDIOVISUAL LIBRARY OF INT’L LAW, 
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/vcpol/vcpol.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2013) (stating that in 
the 1970s, scientists realized that manmade chemicals could harm the ozone layer) (on file 
with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 384. See id. (“The Convention . . . was opened for signature at Vienna on 22 March 
1985.”).  
 385. See Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, opened for 
signature Sept. 16 1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 28, 28 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol]. 
 386. See Vienna Convention supra note 382, at art. 2 ¶ 2(b) (stating that parties will 
work to “control, limit, reduce, or prevent” activities that harm the ozone layer). 
 387. See Montreal Protocol, supra note 385, at 31–33 (listing requirements related to 
certain controlled substances, and the limits for use and production). 
 388. See Vienna Convention, supra note 382, at pmbl. (stating that parties to the 
convention are “[d]etermined to protect human health and the environment against adverse 
effects resulting from modifications of the ozone layer”); Montreal Protocol, supra note 385, 
pmbl. (stating that parties to the convention are “[d]etermined to protect the ozone layer by 
taking precautionary measures to control . . . global emissions of substances that deplete it”). 
 389. See generally Simone Tilmes et al., The Sensitivity of Polar Ozone Depletion to 
Proposed Geoengineering Schemes, SCIENCE MAG., May 30, 2008, at 1201, available at 
http://www.sciencemag.org/content/320/5880/1201.full.pdf?sid=f502b927-7b6a-4d39-817f-
caf88a076324 (discussing the impact of atmospheric injection on the ozone layer) (on file 
with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 390. See id. at 1201 (“The combination of very low temperatures and increasing 
sunlight after the polar night results in a strong transformation of chlorine from reservoir 
forms to reactive radicals, leading to the rapid destruction of polar ozone.”). 
 391. See Tilmes et al., supra note 161, at 20 (“The injection of a constant amount of 
sulfur in the stratosphere, as considered here, results in a constant offset of temperatures in 
the tropics at different altitudes after an adjustment time in the troposphere of approximately 
5 years.”). 
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substitutes that do not deplete the ozone layer should not fall within the 
restrictions of these treaties. 
 
6. Convention on Biological Diversity 
The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)392 seeks to 
conserve biodiversity and promote sustainable uses of its components.393 
The overarching principle that guides the agreement is that nations have 
“the sovereign right to exploit their own resources” but the “responsibility 
to ensure” that activities within their own borders “do not cause damage 
beyond the limits of [their] national jurisdiction.”394 
In 2008, the parties to the CBD considered adopting a moratorium 
on all ocean fertilization efforts.395 Instead, they adopted an approach 
similar to the approach taken by the London Convention, requiring an 
adequate scientific basis and a global regulatory mechanism.396 In 2010, the 
parties adopted COP 10 Decision X/33, which expands the CBD to address 
all climate engineering activities.397 Decision X/33 provides that parties 
ensure that “no climate-related geo-engineering activities that may affect 
biodiversity take place, until there is an adequate scientific basis on which 
to justify such activities, . . . with the exception of small scale scientific 
research studies . . . .”398 Thus, even though the CBD restricts the 
implementation of climate engineering, the parties nevertheless recognize 
                                                                                                                           
 392. Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature June 5, 1992, 1760 
U.N.T.S. 142 [hereinafter CBD]. 
 393. See id. at 146 (stating that objectives include the “conservation of biological 
diversity, [and] the sustainable use of its components”). 
 394. Id. at 147.  
 395. See Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice 
[SBSTTA], Biodiversity and Climate Change: Options for Mutually Supportive Actions 
Addressing Climate Change Within the Three Rio Conventions, § A, ¶ 21, SBSTTA 13 
Recommend. XIII/6 (Feb. 18–22, 2008), available at 
http://www.cbd.int/recommendation/sbstta/default.shtml?id=11619 (urging parties to adopt a 
moratorium on all ocean fertilization activities because of questions about its effectiveness 
and its potential adverse impacts on marine biodiversity) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND 
LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 396. See Redgwell, supra note 346, at 187 (explaining the approach to ocean 
fertilization activities that the CBD adopted). 
 397. See Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
Biodiversity and Climate Change, ¶ 8(w), Decision X/33 (Oct. 29, 2010), [hereinafter COP 
Decision X/33.8(w)], available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cop-10/cop-10-dec-33-
en.pdf (addressing “climate-related geo-engineering activities,” and not just ocean 
fertilization activities) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, 
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 398. See id. ¶ 8(w) n.3 (explaining that geoengineering activities are defined as “any 
technologies that deliberately reduce solar insulation or increase carbon sequestration from 
the atmosphere on a large scale that may affect biodiversity”). 
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the need to allow small-scale research.399 Regardless, these provisions do 
not apply to the United States, since it is not a party to the CBD.400 
 
7. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC)401 commits parties to gather information regarding greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions, and to prepare for the effects of climate change.402 
The United States became a party to the UNFCCC in 1992.403 The 
subsequent Kyoto Protocol requires nations to commit to legally binding 
reductions in GHGs.404 The United States has signed the Kyoto Protocol, 
but the Senate has not ratified it.405  
Because of their focus on mitigation and adaptation, neither the 
UNFCCC nor any of the related agreements, such as the Kyoto Protocol, 
address climate engineering directly.406 Parties to the UNFCCC commit to 
conserve and enhance carbon sinks, however, including forests and 
oceans.407 Given these sinks’ ability to remove carbon from the atmosphere, 
this commitment is consistent with the aims of geoengineering, particularly 
                                                                                                                           
 399. See id. ¶ 8(w) (stating that climate engineering technologies that influence 
biodiversity cannot take place unless they are small-scale research projects). 
 400. See CBD, supra note 392, at n.1 (listing the parties to the convention and their date 
of ratification, and the United States is not included). 
 401. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signature 
May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 164 [hereinafter UNFCCC Treaty], available at 
http://treaties.un.org/doc/source/RecentTexts/unfccc_eng.pdf. 
 402. See id. (introducing the requirements of the convention). 
 403. See id. at 166 n.1 (indicating that the United States ratified the UNFCCC on Oct. 
15, 1992). 
 404. See Background on the UNFCCC: The International Response to Climate Change, 
UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
http://unfccc.int/essential_background/items/6031.php (last visited October 24, 2013) 
(explaining how the Kyoto Protocol adds on to UNFCCC) (on file with the WASHINGTON 
AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 405. See Status of Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK 
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php (last visited October 
24, 2013) (noting that the United States signed the Kyoto Protocol on Nov. 12, 1998, but has 
not ratified it) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND 
THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 406. See generally UNFCCC Treaty, supra note 401 (focusing entirely on mitigation of 
climate change, and not addressing geoengineering). 
 407. See id. at art. 4, ¶ 1(d) (stating that one of the UNFCCC Treaty’s purposes is to 
“promote sustainable management, and promote and cooperate in the conservation and 
enhancement . . . of sinks and . . . forests”). 
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CDR.408 As this paper will discuss later, the UNFCCC also requires nations 
to cooperate in the “full, open, and prompt exchange” of scientific and 
technological information concerning the climate system.409 
 
8. Regulation of Transboundary Pollution 
Transboundary pollution consists of “pollution whose physical 
origin is situated wholly or in part within the area under the jurisdiction of 
one [state] and which has adverse effects, other than effects of a global 
nature, in the area under the jurisdiction of [another state].”410 Customary 
international law requires states to ensure that activities under their 
jurisdiction do not cause such harm.411 The Trail Smelter Arbitration 
between the United States and Canada applied this principle.412 
Subsequently, the Convention on Environmental Impact 
Assessment in a Transboundary Context (Espoo Convention)413 was formed 
to regulate transboundary harms.414 The Espoo Convention requires parties 
to assess the environmental impact of activities at an early stage and to 
notify and consult each other on all major projects likely to have a 
                                                                                                                           
 408. See ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 5, at 1 (stating that geoengineering aims to offset 
the effects of climate change, and the commitments under the UNFCCC also have this goal). 
 409. UNFCCC Treaty, supra note 401, at art. 4, ¶ 1(h); see also INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Agreed Reference Material for the IPCC Fifth Assessment 
Report (2013) (unpublished outline), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/ar5/ar5-outline-
compilation.pdf (including several geoengineering topics in the chapter outlines, even 
though UNFCCC has not yet addressed climate engineering) (on file with the WASHINGTON 
AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 410. Agreement on Air Quality art. I, ¶ 2, U.S.-Can., Mar. 13, 1991 30 I.L.M. 676, 679 
(1991). 
 411. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U. S. § 601 (2013) 
(describing state responsibility for environmental injury to other jurisdictions as a result of 
the state’s actions). 
 412. See Jon M. Van Dyke, Liability and Compensation for Harm Caused by Nuclear 
Activities, 35 DENVER J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 13, 13 (2006) (stating that the Trail Smelter 
Arbitration applied the “no-harm rule”); see also Noah D. Hall, Transboundary Pollution: 
Harmonizing International and Domestic Law, 40 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 681, 696 (2007) 
(describing the facts of the case and how the Trail Smelter Arbitration is unique because it 
remains the only international decision that specifically involves transfrontier pollution); id. 
at 696–98 (describing how the tribunal held that no state may permit its territory to be used 
in a manner to cause injury by fumes in the territory of another state). 
 413. Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, 
opened for signature Feb. 25, 1991, 1989 U.N.T.S. 309 [hereinafter Espoo Convention]. 
 414. See id. at pmbl. (stating that one of the purposes of the Espoo Convention is to 
“enhance international co-operation in assessing environmental impact in particular in a 
transboundary context”). 
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significant, adverse environmental impact across boundaries.415 Although a 
signatory to the Espoo Convention, the United States has not ratified it.416 
Separately, though, the United States and Canada entered into an agreement 
to address acid rain caused by transboundary pollution.417 This agreement 
would implicate sulfur aerosols.418 Other aerosol methods, however, are 
unlikely to fall under this agreement or related precedent.419 
 
C. A Summary—Regulatory Coverage of Climate Engineering by the 
United States. 
Because both domestic and international environmental laws 
developed to address pollution, there are only a series of patchwork 
amendments provide sporadic coverage of climate engineering research and 
testing.420 A comprehensive regulatory regime has been developed for only 
one method, a subcategory of carbon sequestration.421 Other methods, 
including ocean fertilization and stratospheric aerosol injections, may be 
                                                                                                                           
 415. See id. at art. III (describing requirements for notifying nearby states of activities 
likely to have a transboundary impact). 
 416. See Status: Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary 
Context, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-
4&chapter=27&lang=en (last visited Jan. 6, 2014) (indicating that the United States signed 
the convention on Feb. 26, 1991) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF 
ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 417. See Agreement on Air Quality, U.S.-Can., Mar. 13, 1991, 1852 U.N.T.S. 80 
(noting that a broader North American Agreement on Transboundary Environmental Impact 
Assessment between Canada, Mexico, and the United States has been drafted, but final 
negotiations have stalled over the application of the agreement to state and local 
governments); see also Charles M. Kersten, Rethinking Transboundary Environmental 
Impact Assessment, 34 YALE J. INT’L LAW 173, 178 (2009) (describing the value of 
international environmental impact statements). 
 418. See Agreement on Air Quality, supra note 417, at annex (enumerating objectives 
concerning the reduction of sulfur dioxide); id. at art. I (defining “air pollution” as “the 
introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances into the air resulting in deleterious 
effects of such a nature as to endanger human health, harm living resources and 
ecosystems”). 
 419. See Davidson et al., supra note 117, at 4266 (describing the properties of 
alternatives to sulfur aerosols). 
 420. See BRACMORT & LATTANZIO, supra note 165, at 24 (“While no federal law has 
been enacted with the express purpose of covering geoengineering activities, some legal 
instruments may currently apply to domestic geoengineering practices and their impacts, 
depending on the type, location, and sponsor of the activity.”). 
 421. See id. (“In July 2008, the [EPA] relied on its authority under the Safe Water 
Drinking Act to issue a draft rule that would regulate CO2 injection for the purposes of 
geological sequestration.”). 
150 5 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY CLIMATE & ENV’T 93 (2013) 
affected by existing federal law.422 Meanwhile, other methods of climate 
engineering remain almost wholly unregulated.423 
The following table identifies the primary climate engineering 
methods currently identified by scientists and the United States laws and 




Method Regulating Laws 
Ocean fertilization MPRSA, London 
Convention 
Ground-based reflectors ESA (indirect) 
Sequestration—underground Safe Drinking Water Act 
Sequestration - subseabed (None) 
Aerosols - sulfur CAA, Montreal Protocol, 
LRTAP, Canada-U.S. 
Agreement 
Aerosols - non-sulfur  (None) 
Space-based mirrors (None) 
Enhanced up/downwelling (None) 
Cloud whitening (None) 
 
Table 1 highlights several aspects of the patchwork nature of the 
United States’ regulation of climate engineering activities. First, only three 
methods are regulated directly: carbon dioxide sequestration, ocean 
fertilization, and sulfur aerosol injection.424 The parties to the London 
                                                                                                                           
 422. See id. at 24–25 (discussing geoengineering methods and the federal laws that may 
regulate them). 
 423. See id. at 26 (noting the lack of unified federal regulatory authority over 
geoengineering techniques); id. at 25 (“Moreover, in the absence of federal lawmaking, 
some states have begun developing their own policies to address particular geoengineering 
activities.”). 
 424. See id. at 23–25 (noting the EPA’s jurisdiction pursuant to the Clean Air Act and 
Clean Water Act to regulate carbon dioxide sequestration, ocean fertilization, and 
stratospheric aerosol injection). 
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Convention and the London Protocol, after the disputes arising from the 
Planktos incident, amended those agreements to incorporate ocean 
fertilization.425 The EPA recently approved regulations pursuant to the Safe 
Drinking Water Act to control carbon sequestration.426 Finally, sulfur 
aerosols fall within both domestic (Clean Air Act) and international (the 
LRTAP, Montreal Protocol, and the Canada-U.S. Agreement) 
regulations.427 
To the extent that United States law or binding international law 
regulates other methods, it does so indirectly, occasionally, or loosely. For 
example, the ESA does not directly regulate the placement of reflectors,428 
but it may be implicated if their placement harmed a threatened or 
endangered species.429 NEPA also does not apply to any particular 
method,430 but its requirements may be implicated by any geoengineering 
efforts that require major federal action.431 The Outer Space Treaty extends 
to injuries caused by space objects,432 but it addresses militaristic uses of 
space.433 Similarly, ENMOD, which prohibits weather manipulation, is 
directed to military efforts.434 
Table 1 also demonstrates that no uniform body of regulations 
governs the development and deployment of climate engineering. Sections 
of different statutes or treaties address different aspects of geoengineering, 
but they were approved at different times in response to different 
circumstances.435 Moreover, these laws were approved at different times in 
response to different circumstances.436 No comprehensive regulatory 
                                                                                                                           
 425. See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing the development of the London Convention). 
 426. See generally Class VI Rule, supra note 210 (implementing requirements for 
carbon sequestration). 
 427. See generally supra Part III.A and B (discussing domestic and international laws 
that may govern aerosol injection). 
 428. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531–44 (lacking explicit mention of solar reflectors). 
 429. See id. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (“[I]t is unlawful for any person subject to the jurisdiction 
of the United States to . . . take any [endangered] species within the United States . . . .”). 
 430. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2012). 
 431. See id. § 4332(c) (requiring detailed environmental impact statement for major 
federal action affecting the quality of the human environment). 
 432. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 357 (noting the application of the treaty to 
injuries from outer space activities). 
 433. See id. (discussing that the context of the treaty relates to military action). 
 434. See ENMOD, supra note 343 (observing that the application of this agreement 
affects military action). 
 435. See BRACMORT & LATTANZIO, supra note 165, at 24–28 (describing the piecemeal 
nature of government oversight of geoengineering activities). 
 436. See id. at 24 (describing how the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 might apply 
to aerosol injection). 
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scheme has been developed for climate engineering, nor does any single 
body regulate these efforts.437 
Finally, no federal law expressly prohibits any type of climate 
engineering.438 
 
IV. The United States Should Enact a Comprehensive Legal Scheme to 
Regulate and Encourage Climate Engineering Research and Testing 
Nothing short of drastic measures can avert significant climate 
change.439 Thus, society must explore alternatives to mitigation and 
adaptation to minimize the consequences of this change.440 The United 
States should take a leadership role in this effort. To do so, it must develop 
a comprehensive scheme of regulation, establish a regulatory body to 
oversee these efforts, and facilitate this research. Furthermore, by instituting 
a domestic program addressing climate engineering research, this program 
may become a model for a future international agreement. 
 
A. The United States Should Promptly Commence a Geoengineering 
Research Program 
For several reasons, the United States should not wait for an 
international agreement to be reached; it should commence its own research 
on geoengineering.441 Several reasons support this conclusion. First, the 
realities of climate change and the time to develop responsive technologies 
necessitate that research commence forthwith.442 As discussed previously, 
the planet is already warming, and numerous feedbacks in the climate 
                                                                                                                           
 437. See id. (discussing how in the absence of a federal program, “some legal 
instruments may currently apply to domestic geoengineering efforts and their impacts”). 
 438. See id. (“[N]o federal law has been enacted with the express purpose of covering 
geoengineering activities . . . .”). 
 439. See ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 5, at ix (“It is likely that global warming will 
exceed 2° C this century unless global greenhouse gas emissions are cut by at least 50% of 
1990 levels by 2050, and by more thereafter.”). 
 440. See id. (“Unless future efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions are much more 
successful than they have been so far, additional action may be required should it become 
necessary to cool the Earth this century.”). 
 441. See Davis, supra note 154, at 907–08 (suggesting the United States should not 
wait to complete such arrangements before commencing its program). 
 442. See BRACMORT & LATTANZIO, supra note 165, at 3 (“Little research has been done 
on most geoengineering methods, and no major directed research programs are in 
place . . . [but] more research would be required to test the feasibility, effectiveness, cost, 
social and environmental impacts, and the possible unintended consequences of 
geoengineering before deployment.”). 
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system may accelerate this warming,443 which will continue regardless of 
the success of mitigation efforts.444 Structural characteristics of our energy 
system will perpetuate significant carbon emissions for decades.445 
Moreover, research, modeling, and testing climate engineering proposals 
will require many years.446 
Second, a meaningful international agreement is not likely to be 
adopted soon.447 Particularly when novel issues are involved, the process of 
reaching international agreement can be time-intensive.448 Further 
complicating the process will be the conflicting interests of nations.449 
Some countries, for instance, may seemingly benefit from climate change 
(especially northern countries such as Russia and Canada);450 fossil fuel 
producers and developing countries stand to benefit from business as usual, 
while smaller nations may be concerned that larger or richer countries will 
determine their fates.451 Because of the nature of climate engineering, the 
only international consensus on the issue might be to impose a moratorium 
on research and deployment.452 Unfortunately, the parties most likely to 
abide by a moratorium are precisely those most likely to study, test, and 
                                                                                                                           
 443. See supra Part II.B (noting, for example, that increasing global temperatures will 
melt permafrost and release methane, further exacerbating global warming). 
 444. See supra Part II.C (summarizing arguments that mitigation alone is inadequate to 
prevent global warming). 
 445. See supra Part II.C (discussing structural aspects of the energy market that impede 
adoption of clean technologies). 
 446. See ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 5, at 52 (“A R&D programme on geoengineering 
methods . . . could reduce many of the uncertainties within 10 years.”). 
 447. See Carlin, supra note 145, at 725 (arguing that an international agreement 
“appears very unlikely given the history of voluntary international cooperation between 
nations”); David G. Victor, On the Regulation of Geoengineering, 24 OXFORD REV. ECON. 
POL’Y 322, 324 (2008) (“From today’s vantage point, a treaty negotiation would yield 
inconclusive outcomes . . . .”). 
 448. See ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 5, at xi (discussing current and potential 
international governance problems). 
 449. See id. (“The acceptability of geoengineering will be determined as much by 
social, legal and political issues as by scientific and technical factors.”);  
 450. See Nives Dolsak, Mitigating Global Climate Change: Why Are Some Countries 
More Committed Than Others?, 29 POL’Y STUD. J. 414, 422 (2001) (discussing how 
geographic and economic factors influence countries’ climate change goals). 
 451. See Victor., supra note 447, at 324 (“ Economic growth tends to trump vague and 
elusive global aspirations.”). 
 452. See BRACMORT & LATTANZIO, supra note 165, at 22–23 (noting that at the 2012 
climate talks in Doha, the U.N. Climate Change Secretariat dismissed suggestions that the 
time had arrived to explore geoengineering); see also Alister Doyle, Geo-Engineering Wins 
Scant Enthusiasm at U.N. Climate Talks, REUTERS (Dec. 2, 2012), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/02/us-climate-talks-geoengineering-
idUSBRE8B103Y20121202 (discussing the uncertainty surrounding geoengineering and 
potential responses) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
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assess these technologies responsibly.453 A moratorium would thus “leave 
less responsible governments and individuals—those most prone to ignore 
or avoid inconvenient international norms—to control the technology’s 
fate.”454 
Another aspect of international treaties, their inherent conservatism, 
will further reduce the value of an agreement.455 Nations typically water 
down the terms of treaties to levels that ensure that compliance is readily 
achievable.456 When compliance is not easily achievable, nations simply do 
not join.457 In the context of climate engineering, this tendency might limit 
the methods that are open for consideration or minimize the amount of 
research and testing that is conducted.458 Nations lacking the technical 
ability might seek to limit research and testing.459 If a treaty’s conditions 
were too restrictive, nations with the ability to pursue climate engineering 
might simply decline to join the treaty.460 We already see examples of this 
process in the recent amendments to the London Protocol and in the 
Convention on Biological Diversity.461 
Finally, the United States should commence its own program now 
to ensure that domestic geoengineering activities are appropriately 
overseen.462 Theoretical understanding of climate engineering is increasing, 
so that scientists and entrepreneurs are beginning to commence their own 
                                                                                                                           
 453. See Victor, supra note 447, at 326 (“A taboo is likely to be most constraining on 
the countries (and their subjects) who are likely to do the most responsible testing, 
assessment, and (if needed) deployment of geoengineering systems.”). 
 454. Id. at 327.  
 455. See id. at 331 (describing how opposing interests water down the treaty-making 
process).  
 456. See id. (“[C]ountries adjust their commitments to the point where they are sure that 
compliance is feasible and because they do not join when commitments are too 
demanding.”).  
 457. See id. at 333 (pointing to the Kyoto Protocol as an example of these tendencies of 
international agreements). 
 458. See id. (noting that the participation of more nations would lead to more research). 
 459. See id. (“Most nations would probably favor a ban on geoengineering because 
only a few countries actually have the capability to geoengineer on their own.”). 
 460. See id. (“[T]he few nations with unilateral geoengineering capabilities would seek 
favorable (i.e. vague) language [in the treaty]; if unsuccessful, those countries could simply 
refuse to join.”). 
 461. See supra Part III.B.7 (describing how European nations inserted restrictive 
language on genetically-engineered crops and the United States, the leader in this field, then 
refused to join the treaty; see also Victor, supra note 447, at 331 (stating that the 
development of the CBD followed this pattern). 
 462. See BRACMORT & LATTANZIO, supra note 165, at 21 (discussing concerns in an 
oversight regime for geoengineering); Andy Ridgwell, Chris Freeman & Richard Lampitt, 
Geoengineering: Taking Control of Our Planet’s Climate?, 370 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL 
SOC’Y A 4163, 4163–65 (2012) (examining the level of technological innovation as 
compared to governance development). 
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field experiments.463 In light of the paucity of applicable domestic and 
international laws, few limitations restrict these activities.464 
 
B. The United States Needs to Establish a Single Oversight Body for 
Climate Engineering Research 
The federal government should oversee climate engineering 
research through a multi-disciplinary body. Federal oversight is important 
to ensure that uniform regulations and guidelines control these efforts.465 
Indeed, states have already begun to step into the vacuum created by federal 
inaction.466 The oversight body should be multidisciplinary to confront 
managerial, legal, and scientific issues that could arise.467 The oversight 
body should also be able to address the historical, ethical and social 
implications of geoengineering.468 
Not only should the oversight body incorporate multiple 
perspectives, it should also be a single, self-contained agency.469 Creating a 
                                                                                                                           
 463. See Henry Fountain, A Rogue Climate Experiment Outrages Scientists, N.Y. TIMES 
Oct. 18, 2012, at A1 (examining the ability of individuals to conduct their own climate 
engineering tests). 
 464. See BRACMORT & LATTANZIO, supra note 165, at 24 (“The federal government 
could expand these existing laws to specifically address geoengineering activities or develop 
new laws. In addition, administrative agencies could interpret their statutory authority to 
authorize new rules explicitly addressing particular geoengineering activities.”). 
 465. See GAO, supra note 7, at 23 (“However, without the guidance of an operational 
definition for what constitutes geoengineering or a strategy to capitalize on existing research 
efforts, federal agencies may not recognize or be able to report the full extent of potentially 
relevant research activities.”). 
 466. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 8341(d)(5) (West 2013); see also TEX. NAT. 
RES. CODE ANN. § 91.802(c) (West 2013) (ensuring that both California and Texas 
incorporate consideration of carbon sequestration into their codes.); see also CAL. PUB. RES. 
CODE § 35650(b)(2)(J)(i) (West 2013) (providing state funding for research into carbon 
sequestration in the ocean). 
 467. See Alan Carlin, Implementation & Utilization of Geoengineering for Global 
Climate Change Control, 7 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL. 56, 56–57 (2007) (explaining that 
any organization charged with implementing climate change should strive to establish a high 
level of scientific review, limited legal liability, and cost-efficiency). 
 468. See American Meteorological Society, Policy Statement on Geoengineering the 
Climate System 1 (Mar. 7, 2009) (draft statement), available at 
http://www.ametsoc.org/policy/draftstatements/geoengineering_draftstatement.pdf (“As with 
inadvertent human-induced climate change, the consequences of such actions would almost 
certainly not be the same for all nations and individuals, thus raising legal, ethical, 
diplomatic, and even national security concerns.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE 
JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 469. See Cesar Cordova-Novion & Stephane Jacobzone, Strengthening the Institutional 
Setting for Regulatory Reform: The Experience from OECD Countries 17, 17 (OECD 
Working Papers on Public Governance, No. 19, 2011) (noting that multiple governance 
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single entity will yield the obvious benefits of efficiency, avoidance of 
regulatory gaps or overlap, consistent oversight, and coordination of 
efforts.470 Indeed, while federal agencies have funded some modest climate 
engineering research efforts, these efforts have been disjointed.471 At least 
five agencies have funded geoengineering research.472 Despite this breadth 
of effort, the federal government has yet to form a position or strategy 
concerning climate engineering.473 While the diversity of geoengineering 
technologies lends itself to specialization within different federal 
agencies,474 those familiar with current federally-funded research efforts 
urge the creation of a single, interagency, coordinating body.475 
One benefit of a single oversight body is that it can clearly identify 
those projects which the federal government would consider to fall within 
the umbrella of climate engineering.476 The current lack of such guidance 
stems from the absence of an operational definition of what geoengineering 
incorporates.477 This lack of a clear definition creates several problems. 
First, climate engineering research is difficult to identify, since projects are 
                                                                                                                           
organizations can “foster duplicative and even contradictory initiatives and efforts”) (on file 
with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 470. See id. at 18 (“[Reliance on multiple governance bodies] presents costs: budgetary 
and institutional costs, as various bodies have to compete for scarce talent among officials; 
administrative costs to co-ordinate these institutions; and most importantly the lack of a 
more robust single voice advocating regulatory quality.”). 
 471. See Geoengineering III: Domestic and International Research Governance, 
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Science, Space and Technology, 111th Cong. 8–10 (2010) 
(statement of Frank Rusco, Director of Natural Resources and Environment, Gov’t 
Accountability Office), available at 
http://archives.democrats.science.house.gov/publications/Testimony.aspx?TID=15379 (“Our 
observations to date indicate that federal agencies . . . have funded some research and small-
scale technology testing relevant to proposed geoengineering approaches on an ad-hoc 
basis.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT). 
 472. See id. (explaining how efforts are spread among the Department of Energy, the 
National Science Foundation, the Department of Agriculture, NASA, and the EPA). 
 473. See id. at 9 (“Staff from federal offices coordinating the U.S. response to climate 
change . . . stated that they do not currently have a geoengineering strategy or position.”). 
 474. See id. (“Federal officials noted that a large fraction of the existing federal 
research and observations on basic climate change and earth science could be relevant to 
improving understanding about proposed geoengineering approaches and their potential 
impacts.”). 
 475. See GAO, supra note 7, at 38 (noting that absent a definition, some actions may 
not be identified as geoengineering). 
 476. See id. (examining the regulatory options for a federal geoengineering program). 
 477. See Ralph Bodle, Climate Law and Geoengineering, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE 
LAW 447, 466–67 (Erkki J. Hollo, Kati Kulovesi & Michael Mehling, eds., 2013) 
(discussing the technical problems with identifying what activities fall under the label of 
“geoengineering”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
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not consistently recognized as falling within it.478 Second, this lack of 
clarity hampers efforts to coordinate geoengineering research.479 Third, it 
risks some activities being brought under the umbrella of climate 
engineering that most scientists would not label as such.480 Not only is a 
functional definition of climate engineering necessary, the oversight body 
also needs to be flexible in its application to take into account technological 
advancements that may suggest new methods to engineer the climate.481 
 
C. The United States’ Program Should be Fully Transparent 
The United States’ program should follow certain guidelines. First, 
it should be transparent, research plans and results should be readily 
available.482 Transparency will serve several purposes. First, it will assure 
that others conducting similar research will remain informed of the most 
recent developments.483 Second, transparency will assure other nations and 
the general public of the integrity and objectives of the program.484 Absent 
such assurances, the development of a research and testing program may 
                                                                                                                           
 478. See GAO, supra note 7, at 38 (discussing the lack of consensus about what 
activities constitute geoengineering). 
 479. See id. (“Variations in agencies’ interpretation of our data request, as well as the 
comments noted above, support our recommendation that additional clarity and guidance 
regarding the federal approach to geoengineering is needed, and that further discussion of 
what types of activities should be included in a federal operational definition of 
geoengineering may be warranted.”); see also Gordon, supra note 5, at 38–39 (noting that 
government actions need to be clear before going forward with geoengineering). 
 480. See GORDON, supra note 5, at 38 (stating that many low-risk activities undertaken 
for centuries, such as reforestation, could technically fall within this category). 
 481. See Memorandum from the The Royal Society ¶ 18 (Dec. 2009), available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmsctech/221/10011319.htm 
(explaining that commentators have called for flexibility in the definition of nanotechnology 
to allow regulations to adapt as the science develops and new information comes to light) 
(on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT); see also Diana Bowman, Joel D’Silva & Geert van Calster, Defining 
Nanomaterials for the Purpose of Regulation within the European Union, 1 EUROPEAN J. 
RISK REG. 115, 121 (2010) (noting the difficulty policymakers have had in defining 
nanomaterials given advances in technology). 
 482. See GAO, supra note 7, at 37 (“[A]ny framework governing research should 
include several elements, such as transparency . . . .”). 
 483. See id. at 38 (“[L]ack of information may hinder policy decisions and governance 
at the domestic and international level.”). 
 484. See The Principles, supra note 192 (urging transparency to minimize the tendency 
for individual action to be perceived as potentially infringing on the sovereignty of other 
nations by crossing national boundaries); see also Memorandum from the Dep’t of Energy 
and Climate Change (Jan. 2010), available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmsctech/221/10011306.htm 
(examining the need for international regulation of geoengineering) (on file with the 
WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
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inspire an “arms race” in which other nations ramp up their own programs, 
possibly reducing interest in cooperation on other climate issues.485 
Furthermore, some segment of society is likely to remain skeptical of 
climate engineering.486 Full disclosure of its strengths and weaknesses will 
help to keep this response to a minimum.487 
Transparency can also help to discourage unilateral testing and 
implementation of climate engineering.488 Already, private interests have 
attempted or begun field testing.489 Keeping all nations equally informed of 
geoengineering findings can help to deter rogue entities from unilaterally 
implementing methods determined to have exceptional risks.490 
Transparency also will better enable nations to monitor for unsanctioned 
geoengineering implementation.491 Dissemination of results will keep 
nations informed of methods, technologies, and their consequences, thereby 
better enabling nations to monitor for “covert” geoengineering.492 Finally, it 
will foster an expectation of transparency around climate engineering, 
which will be critical should circumstances necessitate that implementation 
be given serious consideration.493 
 
                                                                                                                           
 485. See SCI. AND TECH. COMM., THE REGULATION OF GEOENGINEERING—FIFTH 
REPORT, 2010, H.C. 221, at 32, available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmsctech/221/221.pdf 
(“[N]on-public SRM research would exacerbate international mistrust about unilateral 
control, provoking such disputes and potentially sparking a proliferation of similarly closed 
programs.”). 
 486. See Jay Michaelson, Geoengineering and Climate Management: From 
Marginality to Inevitability, 46 TULSA L. REV. 221, 239 (2010) (discussing the changing 
values and approaches to climate change management). 
 487. See id. at 227–29 (describing the probability of eventual acceptance of climate 
management actions). 
 488. See ROBERT L. OLSON, GEOENGINEERING FOR DECISION MAKERS 53 (2011), 
available at 
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Geoengineering_for_Decision_Makers_0.pdf 
(explaining how an international governance system needs to be able to deter 
experimentation) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 489. See, e.g., Fountain, supra note 463 (describing the actions of a “California 
businessman” who experimented with ocean fertilization and “outraged scientists and 
government officials”). 
 490. See Olson, supra note 488, at 32 (“But if research indicates that deploying that 
technology could be expected to have dreadful side effects, it is less likely to be used by a 
rogue actor. We need to know what approaches to avoid even if we are desperate.”). 
 491. See id. at 58 (discussing one of the major risks of geoengineering implementation 
without appropriate governance). 
 492. See Lawrence, supra note 177, at 246 (discussing problems with poorly-informed 
policymakers). 
 493. See Olson, supra note 488, at 39–40 (explaining how establishing legitimacy is 
crucial to any consensus on geoengineering).  
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D. The Program Should Prohibit Actual Implementation 
The research program must be exactly that—a program for research 
and testing, and not the beginning of implementation.494 Thus, when it 
commences this program, the United States must place a moratorium on the 
use of climate engineering.495 This will serve two purposes. First, it will 
ameliorate concerns, especially from other nations, that the United States is 
preparing to commence geoengineering unilaterally.496 Second, it will 
encourage a clear demarcation between research and implementation.497 A 
clear division is important so that concerns regarding implementation will 
not affect decisions regarding research.498 
 
E. The United States Should Use NEPA and Financial Incentives to 
Conduct Geoengineering Research and Testing 
The United States should combine a set of regulations and 
incentives as part of a climate engineering program.499 Computer modeling, 
which would be nearly impossible to police and engenders few risks,500 
would not need to be regulated. All field testing would require federal 
approval, however.501 Prior to approval, which would be considered a major 
federal action, the agency would be required to complete the NEPA 
process.502 This would make advance consideration of testing’s impacts 
more likely.503 More importantly, it will ensure that the public is fully 
informed about the experiment.504 
                                                                                                                           
 494. See id. at 44 (arguing that unapproved implementation could hamper 
geoengineering governance). 
 495. See Davis, supra note 154, at 946 (“First, in order to head off a backlash by the 
international community against geoengineering, environmental research and testing should 
be implemented in conjunction with a unilateral moratorium against deployment.”). 
 496. See id. at 945–46 (arguing that the United States should both self-impose a 
moratorium and should “attempt to persuade other countries conducting active 
environmental research programs to adopt such a moratorium”). 
 497. See id. at 944–45 (“A self-imposed prohibition on deployment would clarify the 
distinction between research and deployment.”). 
 498. See id. at 946 (explaining the difference between a research and experimental 
program). 
 499. See BRACMORT & LATTANZIO, supra note 165, at 25–26 (discussing the current 
and potential uses of government entities to encourage and regulate geoengineering). 
 500. See ROYAL SOCIETY, supra note 5, at 17 (noting that computer modeling is already 
occurring). 
 501. See Davis, supra note 154, at 944 (noting how procedural requirements should 
accompany any action). 
 502. See GAO, supra note 7, at 30 (“[G]eoengineering activities undertaken, funded, or 
authorized by federal agencies would be subject to [NEPA].”). 
 503. See id. at 36 (“[T]he legal experts who spoke about domestic regulation generally 
agreed that the federal government should play a role in governing geoengineering 
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This proposal thus parallels the approach taken by the CBD.505 
Although the parties amended the CBD to place a moratorium on 
geoengineering implementation in 2010, it nevertheless allows small-scale 
scientific research studies.506 The CBD allows such efforts only where 
justified by the need to gather specific data and the studies have been 
subject to a thorough prior assessment of the potential impacts on the 
environment.507 Similarly, this proposal prohibits climate engineering 
implementation and allows limited field testing, but requires extensive pre-
testing disclosure and consideration.508 
Second, to encourage private participation and to facilitate testing, 
the federal government should clarify the liability of parties conducting 
field tests.509 It should impose strict liability because of the potentially 
ultra-hazardous nature of these activities.510 On the other hand, the federal 
government should minimize the costs of liability to encourage 
participation in the program. For instance, the federal government could 
require the maintenance of sufficient liability insurance as a precondition to 
approval, but the government could subsidize the premiums or indemnify 
the party for any liability found in excess of the required coverage. 
Currently, the federal government requires nuclear power plant operators to 
maintain insurance, but it covers claims exceeding the mandated amount.511 
Of course, to receive protection from liability, private parties would need to 
satisfy all NEPA and related disclosure requirements and any other 
mandates.512 Furthermore, the federal government should issue appropriate 
                                                                                                                           
research—either by developing research norms and guidelines or applying existing 
regulations and guidelines.”). 
 504. See id. (“[O]ne expert cautioned that discussing deployment could raise the level 
of controversy surrounding the subject.”). 
 505. Supra notes 392ԟ94 and accompanying text. 
 506. Supra note 399 and accompanying text. 
 507. See International Institute for Sustainable Development, EARTH NEGOTIATIONS 
BULL. 20, Nov. 2010 (discussing the development of geoengineering policy in the CBD) (on 
file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 508. See Davis, supra note 154, at 945 (discussing the need for a balance between real 
life testing and avoiding negative side effects). 
 509. See GAO, supra note 7, at 37–38 (stressing the importance of defining liability 
and restitution for damage caused by geoengineering activities). 
 510. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 519 (stating that until climate engineering 
technologies are tested, they should be categorized as ultrahazardous activities because they 
“necessarily involve a risk of serious harm . . . , and [are] not [matters] of common usage”). 
 511. See 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (2012) (defining the amount of required financial protection 
for power plant licensees). 
 512. See GAO, supra note 7, at 30 (discussing the role of NEPA). 
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regulations governing the procedures for testing to ensure, among other 
aspects, safety, data collection, and publication of results.513 
 
F. A United States Program Can Serve as a Model for an International 
Agreement 
An additional benefit of the United States taking the lead in 
supporting and regulating climate engineering research is that its efforts can 
provide a model for, if not a prod to, a future international regime.514 As 
noted previously, only France, Germany, Norway, and the United Kingdom 
have commenced any efforts concerning geoengineering.515 Nevertheless, 
the likelihood of significant warming is increasing, and mitigation is not 
likely by itself to keep the planet from warming at least 2° C.516 Given the 
decades required to study, test, and assess the results from climate 
engineering,517 such efforts must commence shortly. 
Establishment of a domestic program can facilitate development of 
an international agreement.518 National laws often serve as models for 
international agreements.519 For instance, the Americans with Disabilities 
Act and other domestic disability laws served as models for the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.520 In the 
                                                                                                                           
 513. See Davis, supra note 154, at 905 (arguing that an appropriate level of regulation 
is beneficial). 
 514. See id. at 940 (“[Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency]’s organizing 
elements . . . ; cooperation between governments, corporations, and academic institutions; 
and use of networked, collaborative teams organized around specific technological 
challenges have contributed to its success in fostering technological advances. . . . [T]his 
collaborative and performance-oriented approach should be applied internationally.”). 
 515. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the existing state of international environmental 
regulation on geoengineering). 
 516. See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
 517. See Swart & Marinova, supra note 197, at 541 (noting that techniques such as 
solar radiation management may take two decades to study and implement). 
 518. See Victor, supra note 447, at 331 (arguing that research efforts by individual 
nations or academic institutions “would help nations craft the norms that should govern the 
testing and possible deployment of newly developed technologies”). 
 519. See id. (“[C]onnected national efforts would link together in a transnational 
partnership of expert regulators, as has happened in many other areas where regulation rests 
on experts and benefits from international coordination.”). 
 520. See LUISA BLANCHFIELD, CYNTHIA BROUGHER & JAMES V. DEBERGH, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., R42749, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS 
WITH DISABILITIES: ISSUES IN THE U.S. RATIFICATION DEBATE 9–10 (2012), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42749.pdf (reporting that the Senate fell five votes short 
of ratifying the U.N. treaty) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, 
CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT); see also US Senate Rejects UN Treaty on Disability 
Rights Amid GOP Opposition, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 4, 2012), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/dec/04/senate-rejects-un-treaty-disability/print. 
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environmental arena, the United States sulfur emissions trading system has 
served as a model for the European Union Emissions Trading System,521 
which serves as a “fundamental component of the international 
framework”522 for greenhouse gas emissions trading. 
A domestic program can also provide information critical to the 
development of a future international agreement.523 Specifically, it can 
provide a base of experience from which to develop regulatory norms for a 
subsequent international agreement.524 
Many of these proposals find support from those scientists likely to 
be integral in researching and developing climate engineering.525 In 2010, 
the Asilomar International Conference on Climate Intervention 
Technologies convened over 165 experts to consider the conditions and 
precautions appropriate to undertake climate engineering research.526 Their 
recommendations included the creation of new governance and oversight 
                                                                                                                           
(“The [Americans with Disabilities Act] . . . became the blueprint for the UN treaty.”) (on 
file with the WASHINGTON AND LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 521. See Joseph Kruger, From SO2 to Greenhouse Gases, in ACID IN THE ENVIRONMENT 
261, 273 (Gerald R. Visgilio & Diana M. Whitelaw eds., 2007) (discussing the regulation of 
sulfur dioxide). 
 522. See Joseph Kruger, From SO2 to Greenhouse Gases 1 (Resources for the Future, 
Discussion Paper No. 05-20, 2005), available at http://www.rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF-DP-
05-20.pdf (“Internationally, emissions trading is no longer considered a ‘crazy American 
idea.’ It is now a fundamental component of the international framework to address climate 
change. Even developing countries from Chile to China are beginning to consider emissions 
trading programs to control conventional pollutants.”) (on file with the WASHINGTON AND 
LEE JOURNAL OF ENERGY, CLIMATE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT). 
 523. See Victor, supra note 447, at 332–33 (describing the incremental approach in 
developing most international norms). 
 524. See id. at 332 (discussing how “lead countries” help set norms that can be 
integrated into an international agreement). 
 525. See ASILOMAR SCIENTIFIC ORGANIZING COMMITTEE, THE ASILOMAR CONFERENCE 
RECOMMENDATIONS ON PRINCIPLES FOR RESEARCH INTO CLIMATE ENGINEERING TECHNIQUES 
8–9 (2010), available at http://www.climate.org/PDF/AsilomarConferenceReport.pdf 
(outlining principles for responsible scientific involvement in geoengineering). 
 526. See id. at 20 (“Data needed to assess the performance of technologies and 
approaches should be disclosed to allow for open review and evaluation.”). 
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Society needs to increase its mitigation and adaptation efforts. 
Nevertheless, we have reason to expect that these actions alone will not 
prevent significant climate change and its consequences. Accordingly, we 
need to consider additional approaches, such as climate engineering. 
Because of the long lead time necessary to study, test, and prepare 
geoengineering methods should it become necessary, such efforts should 
commence immediately. Since an international agreement may be both 
inadequate and long in coming, the United States should take the lead and 
initiate its own program. 
                                                                                                                           
 527. See id. at 9 (“Governments must clarify responsibilities, and, when necessary, 
create new mechanisms, for the governance and oversight of large-scale climate engineering 
research activities that have the potential or intent to significantly modify the environment or 
affect society.”). 
 528. See id. at 20 (“Climate engineering research should be conducted openly and 
cooperatively, preferably within a framework that has broad international support.”). 
 529. See id. (“[G]overnance mechanisms will need to include provisions for . . . 
promoting transparency and disclosure.”). 
 530. See id. at 24 (“Liability and compensation processes based on ‘no-fault’ principles 
over some range of potential impacts defined in advance of particular experiments may be 
needed as part of the approval process.”). 
